Consciousness and cognition
June 1, 2013
Louis Sass, Elizabeth Pienkos, Barnaby Nelson et al.
144 citations
Anomalous self-experiences are central to schizophrenia and other psychiatric disorders. This analysis compared such experiences in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders, as cataloged in the EASE, with those described in severe depersonalization. Numerous affinities were found, showing that pure forms of diminished self-affection (depersonalization) can involve experiences resembling those of schizophrenia. However, important discrepancies emerged, suggesting that more automatic or deficiency-like factors—probably involving self/world or self/other confusion and erosion of first-person perspective—are more distinctive of schizophrenia-spectrum disorders.
Schizophr Bull
February 1, 2019
Elizabeth Pienkos, Anne Giersch, Marie Hansen et al.
93 citations
Hallucinations are often studied as isolated symptoms, but this review argues that they emerge from a broader set of changes in cognition, perception, selfhood, time, interpersonal experience, and embodiment. The authors suggest that grouping different hallucinatory experiences under a single definition may obscure meaningful differences in their causes and subjective qualities. They review phenomenological and neurocognitive theories and the role of trauma, proposing that hallucinations are an equifinal outcome of multiple genetic, neurocognitive, subjective, and social processes. Future research should incorporate a wider range of experiential alterations, and clinical practice should use phenomenologically responsive techniques and develop targeted therapies.
Consciousness and cognition
September 1, 2013
Louis Sass, Elizabeth Pienkos, Barnaby Nelson
42 citations
Comparing anomalous self-experiences common in schizophrenia with those of normal individuals in an intensely introspective orientation reveals significant similarities but also important differences. Affinities include feelings of passivity, fading of self or world, and alienation from thoughts, feelings, or the lived-body. Differences involve confusion between self and world and severe dislocation or erosion of first-person perspective, qualities unique to schizophrenia. The comparison places putatively schizophrenic self-disorders in a broader context, evaluates hypotheses about core processes in schizophrenia, and orients investigation of pathogenetic pathways and psychotherapeutic interventions.
Schizophrenia research
September 1, 2019
Luís Madeira, Elizabeth Pienkos, Teresa Filipe et al.
18 citations
People with first-episode psychosis often experience profound changes in how they perceive the world around them—including alterations in space, time, and other people—alongside disturbances in their sense of self. In a study comparing 24 outpatients with first-episode psychosis to 24 healthy controls, those with psychosis scored significantly higher on both the Examination of Anomalous World Experience (EAWE) and the Examination of Anomalous Self Experience (EASE). Scores on the two measures were strongly correlated, even after accounting for overlapping items. The types of world-experience anomalies varied widely among patients. These findings suggest that anomalous world experiences are a relevant feature of first-episode psychosis and may be linked to the self-disturbances thought to underlie schizophrenia spectrum disorders.