Skip to content

Melanie Boly

Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI, 53719, USA.

12 papers in the library · 314 citations · publishing 2017-2026

Papers

Unpacking the complexities of consciousness: Theories and reflections.

Neuroscience and biobehavioral reviews March 1, 2025 Liad Mudrik, Melanie Boly, Stanislas Dehaene et al. 68 citations

In a structured public debate at the 2022 meeting of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, proponents of five major theories—Global Neuronal Workspace Theory, Higher-Order Theories, Integrated Information Theory, Recurrent Processing Theory, and Predictive Processing—clarified their theories' core mechanisms, foundational premises, and what each theory aims to explain. The discussion revealed more controversy than agreement, particularly on the most basic questions: what consciousness is, how to identify conscious states, and what any adequate theory must account for. Addressing these foundational disagreements is essential for advancing the field and enabling meaningful comparison of competing theories.

Consciousness and the fallacy of misplaced objectivity.

Neuroscience of consciousness January 1, 2021 Francesco Ellia, Jeremiah Hendren, Matteo Grasso et al. 61 citations

Subjective experience can be objectively explained in physical terms by moving beyond cognitive functions and understanding how experience is structured. Integrated information theory provides a framework to account for both the essential properties of every experience and the specific properties that make particular experiences feel the way they do, avoiding the fallacy that only objective properties should be explained by science.

Are the neural correlates of consciousness in the front or in the back of the cerebral cortex? Clinical and neuroimaging evidence

bioRxiv Preprint Server March 19, 2017 Melanie Boly, Marcello Massimini, Naotsugu Tsychiya et al. 56 citations preprint

The role of the frontal cortex in consciousness is debated. This perspective critically reviews clinical and neuroimaging evidence on whether the front or back of the cortex specifies conscious contents, and discusses promising research avenues. The authors argue that current evidence does not clearly support a primary role for the frontal cortex in generating conscious experience, pointing instead to posterior regions as more directly involved. They suggest that future research should focus on distinguishing neural correlates of consciousness from prerequisites and consequences.

Critical dynamics in spontaneous EEG predict anesthetic-induced loss of consciousness and perturbational complexity.

Communications biology August 5, 2024 Charlotte Maschke, Jordan O'Byrne, Michele Angelo Colombo et al. 50 citations

Consciousness may depend on brain activity poised at criticality—a state with complex patterns and high sensitivity to disruption. Analyzing resting-state EEG from healthy volunteers under propofol, xenon, or ketamine anesthesia, the study found that unconsciousness (from propofol or xenon) shifted brain dynamics away from avalanche criticality and the edge of chaos. Ketamine anesthesia preserved consciousness (vivid dreams) and criticality. Dynamical properties from resting EEG accurately predicted individual values of the perturbational complexity index (PCI), a TMS-based consciousness measure. The findings link perturbational complexity to criticality and suggest criticality is necessary for consciousness.

Increased lucid dream frequency in long-term meditators but not following MBSR training.

Psychology of consciousness (Washington, D.C.) March 1, 2019 Benjamin Baird, Brady A Riedner, Melanie Boly et al. 41 citations

Lucid dreaming occurs more often in long-term meditators than in people who do not meditate. Among non-meditators, lucid dream frequency is linked to the ability to put experience into words, while among meditators it is linked to observing and decentering aspects of mindfulness. However, an 8-week mindfulness course did not increase lucid dream frequency. The findings suggest a continuity between awareness during waking and sleeping states and connect meditation training with meta-awareness, but the precise nature of the link remains unclear.

Episodic thought distinguishes spontaneous cognition in waking from REM and NREM sleep.

Consciousness and cognition January 1, 2022 Benjamin Baird, Mariel Kalkach Aparicio, Tariq Alauddin et al. 17 citations

Spontaneous episodic thoughts about the past and future are common during waking but rarely occur during N2 or REM sleep. Analysis of thought reports from 138 participants who underwent experience-sampling while awake and serial awakenings during sleep shows that waking spontaneous thought frequently includes autobiographical planning with a strong bias toward the future. In contrast, dreaming sleep states rarely feature such mental time travel. This suggests that human consciousness differs substantially across the sleep-wake cycle in how it typically engages with episodic past and future events.

Criticality of resting-state EEG predicts perturbational complexity and level of consciousness during anesthesia.

bioRxiv : the preprint server for biology October 31, 2023 Charlotte Maschke, Jordan O'Byrne, Michele Angelo Colombo et al. 7 citations preprint

Consciousness may depend on brain activity poised at criticality, a state with optimal computational properties. Electroencephalograms were recorded from healthy, unresponsive volunteers under propofol, xenon, or ketamine anesthesia. Ketamine spared consciousness (vivid dreams), allowing separation of unresponsiveness from unconsciousness. Unconscious states showed a departure from both the edge of activity propagation and the edge of chaos. The perturbational complexity index (PCI), a sensitive consciousness measure, was predicted from these dynamical properties with a mean absolute error below 7%. Results link PCI to criticality and support criticality's role in consciousness.

Open multi-center intracranial electroencephalography dataset with task probing conscious visual perception.

Scientific data May 23, 2025 Alia Seedat, Alex Lepauvre, Jay Jeschke et al. 5 citations

An intracranial EEG dataset was collected from 38 epilepsy patients across three research centers as part of an adversarial collaboration testing Global Neuronal Workspace Theory and Integrated Information Theory. Participants viewed visual stimuli—faces, objects, letters, and false fonts—in three orientations and for three durations, performing a Go/No-Go target detection task. The dataset includes demographics, clinical information, electrode reconstructions, behavioral performance, and eye-tracking data, all converted to BIDS format. It is intended for reuse in consciousness science and vision neuroscience to investigate stimulus processing, target detection, and task-relevance.

Neural correlates of pure presence

bioRxiv Preprint Server April 18, 2024 Melanie Boly, Richard Smith, Giulietta Vigueras Borrego et al. 5 citations preprint

A state called pure presence, reported in meditative traditions as a vivid experience without thoughts, perceptions, or self, was examined in twenty-two long-term meditators using high-density EEG. During pure presence, brain activity showed widespread reductions in gamma and delta power compared to mind-wandering, watching a movie, active thinking, and dreamless sleep. The strongest gamma decreases occurred in the posteromedial cortex. These findings align with integrated information theory's prediction that vivid consciousness can arise when the brain's cortical substrate is largely quiet yet highly awake.

Graph Theoretical Analysis of Cortical Networks based on Conscious Experience.

Annual International Conference of the IEEE Engineering in Medicine and Biology Society. IEEE Engineering in Medicine and Biology Society. Annual International Conference July 1, 2019 Minji Lee, Benjamin Baird, Olivia Gosseries et al. 4 citations

Cortical networks show differences in functional integration and segregation across states of consciousness, but not in overall connectivity. In the beta frequency band, functional integration during wakefulness exceeded that during NREM sleep. In the theta band, functional segregation (transitivity and clustering coefficient) was stronger in NREM sleep without conscious experience than in wakefulness or REM sleep, while the opposite pattern appeared in the beta band. No significant differences in the weighted phase lag index were found among wakefulness, REM sleep with conscious experience, NREM sleep with conscious experience, and NREM sleep without conscious experience. These findings may relate to cortical bistability and contribute to understanding neural correlates of consciousness.

Human consciousness and cognition go hand in hand, but require different types of explanations

Aperture Neuro March 18, 2026 Melanie Boly

Consciousness is not an epiphenomenon but a prerequisite for most purposeful behaviors in humans. Over the past two decades, consciousness science has advanced from descriptive correlations to mechanistic predictions, with the Perturbational Complexity Index (PCI) from TMS-EEG indicating about a 95% probability of detecting consciousness in non-communicative patients when purposeful behavior is present. Recent studies in neurotypical individuals and communicative patients, using refined statistical methods and awareness scales validated by subjective reports, consistently suggest that some degree of stimulus awareness is necessary for above-chance performance. Consciousness, intelligence, and cognitive abilities can dissociate, motivating Integrated Information Theory, which generates testable predictions about conscious states independently of behavior.

An adversarial collaboration to critically evaluate theories of consciousness

bioRxiv Preprint Server June 23, 2023 Oscar Ferrante, Urszula Gorska-Klimowska, Simon Henin et al. preprint

An open science adversarial collaboration directly juxtaposed Integrated Information Theory (IIT) and Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNWT) by investigating neural correlates of visual experience. 256 human subjects viewed suprathreshold stimuli for variable durations while neural activity was measured with fMRI, MEG, and ECoG. Information about conscious content was found in visual, ventro-temporal, and inferior frontal cortex, with sustained responses in occipital and lateral temporal cortex reflecting stimulus duration, and content-specific synchronization between frontal and early visual areas.