International journal of psychiatry in clinical practice
July 10, 2025
Stefan Jerotić, Milica Nestorovic, Janko Nešić et al.
3 citations
In two male patients with treatment-resistant depression, a structured interview assessing their felt sense of time (TATE) detected improvements in subjective experience before a standard depression rating scale (MADRS) did. One patient's TATE scores reached general population levels at week 4, one week earlier than the MADRS indicated treatment response. These cases suggest that phenomenological assessments can capture nuanced early improvements that traditional scales may miss, offering a complementary tool for monitoring treatment effectiveness.
Psychopathology
January 1, 2025
Stefan Jerotić, Janko Nešić, Vuk Vuković et al.
3 citations
Psychopharmacology is often reduced to treating biological symptoms while ignoring patients' subjective, embodied experience. This paper proposes an enactive and embodied framework that integrates phenomenology, neuroscience, and physiology to understand how psychotropic drugs affect the entire lived body—altering emotional processing, perception, existential feelings, and the embodied sense of self. Medications shape how patients engage with their environment, which in turn influences the embodied system. The clinician's role is to mediate these embodied changes, supporting patients through shifts in self-perception and relationality. The authors advocate for phenomenological drug profiles and patient-centered interventions that account for subjective and embodied changes alongside clinical efficacy.
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
July 8, 2022
Janko Nešić
2 citations
A recent information-theoretic structural realist theory of the self and consciousness, presented as a form of panpsychism, is examined and argued to face the hard problem of consciousness, similar to Integrated Information Theory. The author proposes introducing a distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic structure and dynamics—specifically intrinsic information and intrinsic structure—to help the theory overcome this problem. These metaphysical enhancements move the theory beyond physicalism. Instead of panpsychism or physicalism, the author suggests combining the information-theoretic structuralist theory with neutral monist ontology, which better fits the framework. These reworkings could yield an improved naturalistic account called the neutral-structuralist theory of consciousness and the self.