Illusionism denies the existence of phenomenal consciousness, claiming that conscious experience is merely an illusion. This creates a normative problem: if there are no real phenomenal experiences, then the moral significance we attach to subjective suffering and well-being may be undermined. The author examines proposed solutions from several philosophers and finds each unsatisfactory. Two alternative resolutions are offered: either weaken illusionism to preserve moral realism, or accept antirealist implications for metaethics, meaning moral facts would lack objective foundation.
This article defends the principle of mereorganic continuity—the idea that personal survival requires the continued existence of a living organic body—against criticisms from Roman Kochnev and Andrei Nekhaev. It first distinguishes how the concept of survival is used in ordinary speech versus Derek Parfit's psychological theory of identity. The principle is then situated within a phenomenalist theory of identity, which holds that conscious experience is fundamental. The author argues that Kochnev's and Nekhaev's objections misinterpret the principle and its role in theories of personal identity. The conclusion is that mereorganic continuity is a commonsense proposition that cannot be rejected without good reason, and neither critic has provided such reasons.