Survival without magic
Омский научный вестник: Серия "Общество. История. Современность" October 2, 2025 DOI: 10.25206/2542-0488-2025-10-3-101-116 via DOAJ
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThis article defends the principle of mereorganic continuity—the idea that personal survival requires the continued existence of a living organic body—against criticisms from Roman Kochnev and Andrei Nekhaev. It first distinguishes how the concept of survival is used in ordinary speech versus Derek Parfit's psychological theory of identity. The principle is then situated within a phenomenalist theory of identity, which holds that conscious experience is fundamental. The author argues that Kochnev's and Nekhaev's objections misinterpret the principle and its role in theories of personal identity. The conclusion is that mereorganic continuity is a commonsense proposition that cannot be rejected without good reason, and neither critic has provided such reasons.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Personal identity Teletransportation Survival Mereorganic continuity Phenomenalism |
| Key finding | The principle of mereorganic continuity is a commonsense proposition that cannot be rejected without good reason, and the objections from Kochnev and Nekhaev fail to provide such reasons. |
Abstract
This article is a critical response to Roman Kochnev’s Parfitian Teletransportation or Error Management and Andrei Nekhaev’s Teletransportation, Replication and Mereology. It defends the principle of the mereorganic continuity from the criticisms made by Kochnev and Nekhaev. First, the concept of survival is analyzed and how its meanings differ in ordinary speech and in Derek Parfit’s psychological theory of identity. Then, the context of the principle of the mereorganic continuity in the phenomenalist theory of identity is described. Based on this context, Kochnev’s and Nekhaev’s objections are refuted. In particular, it is shown that these objections are based on an incorrect interpretation of the principle and the role it should play in our theories of personal identity. It is concluded that the mereorganic continuity is a commonsense proposition that cannot be rejected without good reason, and neither Kochnev nor Nekhaev were able to offer such reasons.