Омский научный вестник: Серия "Общество. История. Современность"
April 6, 2026
K. E. Morozov
Illusionism denies the existence of phenomenal consciousness, claiming that conscious experience is merely an illusion. This creates a normative problem: if there are no real phenomenal experiences, then the moral significance we attach to subjective suffering and well-being may be undermined. The author examines proposed solutions from several philosophers and finds each unsatisfactory. Two alternative resolutions are offered: either weaken illusionism to preserve moral realism, or accept antirealist implications for metaethics, meaning moral facts would lack objective foundation.
Омский научный вестник: Серия "Общество. История. Современность"
April 6, 2026
M. D. Gorbachev
Illusionism denies that phenomenal consciousness and qualia exist, claiming that our belief in them stems from introspective distortion. This raises a normative challenge: if phenomenal consciousness does not exist, illusionism seems incompatible with sentientism, the view that sentience grounds moral status. François Kammerer argues that illusionism must therefore reject sentientism to avoid counterintuitive ethical consequences. This article proposes that the incompatibility arises from a theoretically overloaded understanding of sentience. Three variants are distinguished: K-sentience (classic qualia), Z-sentience (zero qualia), and D-sentience (diet qualia). Only K-sentience is incompatible with illusionism. D-sentience is compatible with illusionism, avoids the problems of diet qualia, and does not force illusionism into undesirable ethical consequences.
Омский научный вестник: Серия "Общество. История. Современность"
October 2, 2025
K. E. Morozov
This article defends the principle of mereorganic continuity—the idea that personal survival requires the continued existence of a living organic body—against criticisms from Roman Kochnev and Andrei Nekhaev. It first distinguishes how the concept of survival is used in ordinary speech versus Derek Parfit's psychological theory of identity. The principle is then situated within a phenomenalist theory of identity, which holds that conscious experience is fundamental. The author argues that Kochnev's and Nekhaev's objections misinterpret the principle and its role in theories of personal identity. The conclusion is that mereorganic continuity is a commonsense proposition that cannot be rejected without good reason, and neither critic has provided such reasons.
Омский научный вестник: Серия "Общество. История. Современность"
December 23, 2025
M. S. Sysoev
Philosophical problems about the mind—the mind-body problem, the unity of consciousness problem, and the binding problem—are closely interconnected and should not be treated in isolation. The author identifies two methodological obstacles in empirical consciousness research: the mereological fallacy and the fallacy of conflating levels of abstraction. These problems are classified by the types of relations they explain, divided into inter-type and intra-type, as well as vertical and horizontal relations. The unity of consciousness problem and the binding problem play a pivotal role in research on the mind-body problem, especially in the search for neural correlates of consciousness, with emphasis on vertical relations. Methodological errors underscore the relevance of this interconnectedness, which can impact hypothesis formulation and research directions.
Омский научный вестник: Серия "Общество. История. Современность"
November 26, 2021
V. A. Sermaksheva
Animalism holds that each person is numerically identical to a human animal. Critics argue that disunity cases, where a human animal lacks mental unity, challenge this view. Tim Bayne recently argued against animalism using Cerberus, a single animal with two heads, each having its own stream of consciousness. This paper shows that Bayne's arguments are flawed and that animalism can handle the Cerberus case.