The exceptionality of enactivism within 4E cognition
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences February 13, 2026 Henrique Mendes 1 citation
Only a specific strain of enactive cognition—autopoietic or autonomist enactivism—genuinely challenges all core tenets of mainstream cognitive science, which are grounded in computationalism, representationalism, functionalism, internalism, and realism. Most other embodied, embedded, or extended cognition theories can be assimilated into the traditional cognitivist framework when suitably qualified. Autopoietic enactivism, rooted in second-order cybernetics and autopoietic theory, demands a deeper reconceptualization of cognition as emergent from dynamic, embodied interaction rather than internal symbol manipulation, resisting realist commitments and leaning toward radical constructivism. Thus, the enactive approach remains the only strand within 4E cognition where a full rejection of foundational assumptions is possible.