Skip to content

Joel Krueger

Department of Sociology, Philosophy and Anthropology, University of Exeter, Exeter, United Kingdom.

5 papers in the library · 217 citations · publishing 2018-2022

Papers

From Wide Cognition to Mechanisms: A Silent Revolution.

Frontiers in psychology January 1, 2018 Marcin Miłkowski, Robert Clowes, Zuzanna Rucińska et al. 82 citations

Several recent 'wide' perspectives on cognition—embodied, embedded, extended, enactive, and distributed—are only partially relevant because cognitive science has already moved beyond them toward integrated mechanistic explanations that include internal submechanisms, interactions with others, groups, cognitive artifacts, and the environment. These wide perspectives function as research heuristics for building such explanations. The argument draws on developments in the study of mindreading and debates on emotions, showing that cognitive neuroscience has undergone a silent mechanistic revolution, turning from binary oppositions toward integration with the broader field.

Enactivism, other minds, and mental disorders

Synthese January 1, 2021 Joel Krueger 55 citations

Cognition is tied to action and extends beyond the brain into the body and environment, according to enactive approaches. If we can directly perceive other people's mental states through their embodied actions and interactions, then we may also directly perceive features of mental disorders. Drawing on Daniel Stern's concept of "forms of vitality," which has been overlooked in debates about direct social perception, the author uses autism as a case study to develop this idea. An enactive account of direct social perception suggests that people play a regulative role in shaping the temporal and phenomenal character of a disorder, which may have practical significance for clinical and therapeutic encounters.

Direct Social Perception

The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition October 9, 2018 Joel Krueger 49 citations

Direct social perception (DSP) holds that people can directly perceive others' mental states—emotions, desires, intentions—through their expressive, goal-directed behavior, challenging the idea that mental states are hidden inside the head. This chapter traces DSP's roots in phenomenologists like Husserl, Scheler, and Merleau-Ponty, and draws on 4E cognition and empirical work suggesting that embodied expressions (facial expressions, gestures) may partly constitute emotions themselves. The author defends DSP against objections, arguing that social cognition does not require inference or simulation to access others' minds.

Out of our heads: Addiction and psychiatric externalism.

Behavioural brain research February 1, 2021 Shane N Glackin, Tom Roberts, Joel Krueger 28 citations

Addiction involves causal factors at many levels—biomedical, neurological, social, and legal—making a simple reductive explanation unlikely. An integrative framework is needed to unify these diverse sciences while respecting their autonomy. The theory of 'Externalist' or '4E' cognition (extended, embodied, embedded, enactive) is proposed as such a framework, emphasizing the central role of the wider environment in mental processes. The paper outlines how this perspective applies to psychiatry generally, then dissolves the classic dichotomy between 'choice model' and 'disease model' of addiction, clarifies how an addict's brain interacts with her environment, and explains the success of some recovery strategies while suggesting new ones.

The Phenomenology of Voice-Hearing and Two Concepts of Voice

Voices in Psychosis September 8, 2022 Sam Wilkinson, Joel Krueger 3 citations

The chapter examines how the term 'voice' in voice-hearing experiences can refer to two distinct concepts: a speech sound or a specific agent. It explores the relationship between these concepts in the context of psychosis, arguing that understanding this distinction is key to making sense of the varied experiences reported by participants.