Frontiers in psychology
January 1, 2020
George Deane, Mark Miller, Sam Wilkinson
88 citations
Disruptions in the ordinary sense of self can lead to either devastating depersonalization or sought-after selfless experiences in meditation. Using the active inference framework, the authors propose that selfhood emerges from a temporally deep generative model that tunes agents to counterfactually rich possibilities for action. Depersonalization may result from an inferred loss of allostatic control, contrasting with the euphoric selfless experiences reported by meditation practitioners. This unified account conceptualizes the experiential similarities and differences between these states, with implications for understanding dissociative disorders and the therapeutic potential and dangers of meditation.
Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences
January 1, 2020
Sam Wilkinson
9 citations
Perceptual presence—the sense that an object is fully present even when only partly seen—is distinct from volumetric content, the awareness of an object's three-dimensional shape. This distinction is explained through predictive processing, which separates agent-active expectations (driven by the perceiver's actions) from object-active expectations (driven by the object's properties). Agent-active expectations generate perceptual presence, while object-active expectations generate volumetric content. Evidence from virtual reality technologies, which create presence through user-controlled exploration, supports this view. The argument clarifies the relationship between sensorimotor enactivism and predictive processing, showing how each contributes to different aspects of perception.
Cognitive neuropsychiatry
January 1, 2022
Sam Wilkinson, Huw Green, Stephanie Hare et al.
8 citations
Philosophy contributes to hallucinations research in three distinct ways. Phenomenology provides a sophisticated, critical understanding of the lived experience of hallucinations. Philosophy of cognitive science enables big-picture theorizing, synthesis of ideas, and critical engagement with new paradigms. Philosophy of science and psychiatry raises theoretically informed questions about diagnosis and categorization. These contributions reflect philosophy's methodological variety and its relevance to hallucinations researchers.
Voices in Psychosis
September 8, 2022
Sam Wilkinson, Joel Krueger
3 citations
The chapter examines how the term 'voice' in voice-hearing experiences can refer to two distinct concepts: a speech sound or a specific agent. It explores the relationship between these concepts in the context of psychosis, arguing that understanding this distinction is key to making sense of the varied experiences reported by participants.