Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences
January 1, 2019
Lambros Malafouris
168 citations
Material Engagement Theory (MET) is a framework in cognitive archaeology and anthropology that argues mind and matter are fundamentally intertwined. The theory proposes that human cognition is shaped through active engagement with material things, a process called thinging, and that the brain is metaplastic, meaning it is continuously reconfigured by cultural practices and tools. Using pottery making as an example, the author shows how MET can guide empirical research and complement phenomenology and embodied cognitive science by revealing how making and handling objects transforms thought and experience.
Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences
January 1, 2021
Simon Høffding, Andrea Schiavio
25 citations
Music-making is better understood as an exploratory activity than solely as aesthetic expression. Drawing on enactive and phenomenological analysis of infants in early musical activities, an expert jazz improviser, and members of a prominent string quartet, the authors argue that music-making involves a dual intentionality: one directed outward toward the sonic, material, and social environment, and one directed inward toward bodily awareness and reflective mental states. In enactivist terms, exploration is a fundamental way of making sense of oneself as coupled with the world. This perspective highlights the developmental, sensorimotor, and advanced cognitive resources involved in music-making.
Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences
January 1, 2020
Sam Wilkinson
9 citations
Perceptual presence—the sense that an object is fully present even when only partly seen—is distinct from volumetric content, the awareness of an object's three-dimensional shape. This distinction is explained through predictive processing, which separates agent-active expectations (driven by the perceiver's actions) from object-active expectations (driven by the object's properties). Agent-active expectations generate perceptual presence, while object-active expectations generate volumetric content. Evidence from virtual reality technologies, which create presence through user-controlled exploration, supports this view. The argument clarifies the relationship between sensorimotor enactivism and predictive processing, showing how each contributes to different aspects of perception.
Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences
January 1, 2025
Catherine Legg, André Sant'Anna
4 citations
Philosophical tensions between realism and enactivism can be resolved through Charles Peirce's pragmatism. Enactivism's Mind-Life Continuity thesis has been interpreted as implying anti-realist 'world-construction', which some find controversial. A proposed 'entity realism' by Zahidi places subjects in worlds of things they can manipulate, but fails to sustain the realist claim that multiple subjects inhabit the same world—a claim crucial for scientific progress. Peirce's distinction between existence and reality, along with his inquiry-based account of cognition, generalizes Zahidi's manipulation-based realism into a richer, inquiry-based enactivist realism. This realism supports pan-species monism about truth, encouraging investigation of non-human animal cognition.
Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences
January 1, 2022
Martin Weichold, Zuzanna Rucińska
3 citations
A reply defends the praxeological enactivist account of pretense against objections raised by Daniel Hutto, who advocates for a radical enactivist explanation. The authors argue that their account holds crucial advantages over Hutto's alternative, addressing criticisms from his paper 'Getting Real About Pretense: A Radical Enactivist Proposal'.