Adaptive behavior
August 1, 2020
Maxwell Jd Ramstead, Michael D Kirchhoff, Karl J Friston
387 citations
The free-energy principle (FEP) and active inference are often conflated with predictive processing frameworks, leading to misunderstandings about their core constructs, generative models and variational densities. This article argues that these models have been systematically misrepresented as structural representations. Instead, under the FEP, generative and recognition models function to realize inference and control—the self-organizing, belief-guided selection of action policies—not as representations with the properties structural representationalists ascribe. The authors propose an enactive interpretation, termed enactive inference, as a more accurate account of these constructs.
Frontiers in human neuroscience
January 1, 2014
Daniel D Hutto, Michael D Kirchhoff, Erik Myin
94 citations
Rejecting mental representation as the basis of cognition, radical enactive and embodied approaches challenge mainstream cognitive science. This paper argues that abandoning representationalism for pure empirical functionalism fails to provide a clear criterion for what counts as cognitive and lacks adequate ways to distinguish cognitive activity. It also contends that commonsense functionalism is undermined by how people actually use psychological concepts. Instead, the authors advocate for extensive enactivism, which differs from extended mind and distributed cognition theories by grounding cognition in embodied action without relying on internal representations.
Frontiers in psychology
January 1, 2018
Daniel D Hutto, Ian Robertson, Michael D Kirchhoff
89 citations
Basic Emotion Theory (BET) has been central to affective science for decades, guiding research on facial expressions, neuroimaging, and evolutionary psychology. Philosophers have recently called for abandoning BET entirely. This paper defends BET against those criticisms, arguing that the theory should be retained. It also addresses concerns that BET's reliance on affect programs makes it outdated. The authors propose that with minor adjustments, BET can overcome these objections when reinterpreted through a radically enactive account of emotions. Rather than discarding BET, the paper shows how its core ideas can be revised and preserved, concluding that the revised BET remains a valuable framework.