Adaptive behavior
August 1, 2020
Maxwell Jd Ramstead, Michael D Kirchhoff, Karl J Friston
387 citations
The free-energy principle (FEP) and active inference are often conflated with predictive processing frameworks, leading to misunderstandings about their core constructs, generative models and variational densities. This article argues that these models have been systematically misrepresented as structural representations. Instead, under the FEP, generative and recognition models function to realize inference and control—the self-organizing, belief-guided selection of action policies—not as representations with the properties structural representationalists ascribe. The authors propose an enactive interpretation, termed enactive inference, as a more accurate account of these constructs.
Synthese
January 1, 2018
Micah Allen, Karl J Friston
387 citations
Predictive processing (PP) approaches to the mind vary widely, from cognitivist views that rely on modular, internal mental representations to radical enactive and embodied theories. This review maps the continuum of PP theories, showing that some emphasize body-representations while others align with dynamic, enactive accounts. The Free Energy Principle (FEP) offers a formal framework that reconciles internalist and externalist perspectives by explaining how internal representations arise from autopoietic self-organization. The FEP thus provides a foundation for empirically productive process theories, such as PP, that guide research through formal modeling of the embodied mind.
The Behavioral and brain sciences
May 30, 2019
Samuel P L Veissière, Axel Constant, Maxwell J D Ramstead et al.
362 citations
A unifying account of how humans acquire shared cultural habits, norms, and expectations is developed by integrating the variational free-energy principle from theoretical neuroscience with concepts of cultural evolution and implicit learning. Humans construct social niches that provide epistemic resources called cultural affordances. Through immersive participation in patterned cultural practices, agents learn by inferring what other people expect—a process termed "thinking through other minds" (TTOM). This makes information about others' expectations the primary statistical regularity humans use to predict and organize behavior. The model aims to resolve debates in cognitive science between internalist and externalist accounts of theory of mind and between dynamical and representational views of enactivism.
Physics of life reviews
March 1, 2025
Simone Battaglia, Philippe Servajean, Karl J Friston
14 citations
The brain's attempt to study itself creates a paradox of self-reference, raising questions about consciousness, psychiatric disorders, and the limits of science. Historically a philosophical issue, modern techniques like functional and structural brain imaging and neurostimulation now allow researchers to probe this inquiry. However, the broader implications remain unclear. The need to use both perception and introspection has led to different formulations of consciousness, and evidence for one does not necessarily support another. Deconstructing this paradox from philosophical and neuroscientific perspectives may yield insights into self-awareness and consciousness.
Physics of life reviews
March 1, 2026
Christopher J Whyte, Andrew W Corcoran, Jonathan Robinson et al.
5 citations
Subjective experience is multifaceted, making it hard for traditional neuroscientific theories of consciousness to be compared because each focuses on different aspects like perceptual awareness or global states. This work instead starts from active inference, a first-principles framework that models behavior as approximate Bayesian inference, and builds a minimal theory of consciousness from shared features of computational models derived under active inference. By reviewing studies that apply active inference models to consciousness, the authors identify a small set of theoretical commitments implicit in these models, pointing toward a minimal and testable theory of consciousness.
Neuroscience and biobehavioral reviews
August 1, 2026
Andrew W Corcoran, Andrew M Haun, Reinder Dorman et al.
Three theories of consciousness—Integrated Information Theory, Neurorepresentationalism, and Active Inference—are compared and contrasted in a structured adversarial collaboration. The review presents each theory's core claims, the phenomena they explain, their explanatory approaches, and methodological strategies. It outlines key hypotheses to be tested across multi-site experiments, discusses observations that would support or challenge each theory, and describes how data from disparate experiments can be formally integrated to quantify evidential support. The work also provides meta-scientific insights into the mechanics of adversarial collaboration and theory-testing, including how theories may be evaluated by the scientific progress they deliver.