bioRxiv Preprint Server
April 10, 2019
Micah Allen, Andrew Levy, Thomas Parr et al.
100 citations
preprint
A formal model of cardiac active inference explains how signals from the heart influence perception of the outside world and confidence in that perception. Simulated experiments reproduce the defensive startle reflex and the link between the cardiac cycle and fear perception. Simulated interoceptive lesions reduce fear expectations, cause psychosomatic hallucinations, and worsen metacognitive biases. Synthetic heart-rate variability analyses show how the balance of arousal-priors and visceral prediction errors creates distinct patterns of physiological reactivity. The model provides a way to computationally characterize disordered brain-body interaction.
Neuroscience and biobehavioral reviews
July 1, 2023
Daniel Collerton, James Barnes, Nico J Diederich et al.
80 citations
Eight distinct models of complex visual hallucinations have been proposed since 2000, each based on different views of brain organization. Researchers from each model group have now agreed on an integrated Visual Hallucination Framework that aligns with current theories of both real and hallucinatory vision. The Framework identifies cognitive systems involved in hallucinations and enables systematic investigation of how hallucination experiences relate to changes in underlying cognitive structures. The episodic nature of hallucinations points to separate factors for their onset, persistence, and end, suggesting a complex relationship between temporary states and long-term traits of hallucination risk. The Framework also suggests new research directions and potential treatments for distressing hallucinations.
Physics of life reviews
March 1, 2026
Christopher J Whyte, Andrew W Corcoran, Jonathan Robinson et al.
5 citations
Subjective experience is multifaceted, making it hard for traditional neuroscientific theories of consciousness to be compared because each focuses on different aspects like perceptual awareness or global states. This work instead starts from active inference, a first-principles framework that models behavior as approximate Bayesian inference, and builds a minimal theory of consciousness from shared features of computational models derived under active inference. By reviewing studies that apply active inference models to consciousness, the authors identify a small set of theoretical commitments implicit in these models, pointing toward a minimal and testable theory of consciousness.
arXiv Preprint Archive
October 9, 2024
Christopher J. Whyte, Andrew W. Corcoran, Jonathan Robinson et al.
Subjective experience is multifaceted, making consciousness hard to study because traditional theories often focus on isolated aspects like perception or wakefulness and are difficult to compare. This work starts from active inference—a first-principles framework that models behavior as approximate Bayesian inference—and builds toward a minimal theory of consciousness derived from shared features of computational models under active inference. Reviewing models applied to consciousness, the authors argue that these models imply a small set of theoretical commitments pointing to a minimal, testable theory of consciousness.
arXiv Preprint Archive
November 7, 2020
Zakaria Djebbara, Thomas Parr, Karl Friston
Perceptual experience of architecture arises from interactions between the body's sensory and motor systems and the built environment. Actions change perceived surroundings based on expectations shaped by bodily capabilities and architectural features. Affordances—the fit between body structure and movement possibilities in a space—underlie continuous sensory information gathering. This paper takes a first step toward understanding architectural design's role in perceptual experience at a neuronal level, proposing a framework that synthesizes computational neuroscience with architectural phenomenology into a computational neurophenomenology. The framework aims to guide future studies linking architecture and cognitive neuroscience.