Current research in neurobiology
January 1, 2022
Christopher J. Whyte, Jakob Hohwy, Ryan Smith
21 citations
Cognitive theories of consciousness link frontoparietal circuits to conscious access, but no-report paradigms challenge this by showing conscious accessibility without prefrontal cortex (PFC) activation. This paper presents a computational model based on active inference, treating working memory gating as a cognitive action. Simulating a visual masking task, the model shows that late P3b-like event-related potentials and increased PFC activity arise from the working memory demands of self-report generation. Removing reporting demands eliminates these late potentials and reduces PFC activity, reproducing no-report paradigm results. However, even without reporting, simulated PFC activity on visible trials still crosses the threshold for reportability, maintaining the link between PFC and conscious access. Thus, no-report paradigm evidence does not necessarily contradict cognitive theories.
PLoS ONE
December 4, 2025
Jonathan Robinson, Andrew W. Corcoran, Christopher J. Whyte et al.
1 citation
Active inference, a framework for modeling how sentient agents behave, is being tested as necessary for changes in conscious content. In an adversarial collaboration, active inference will be contrasted with two other theories that do not require it for consciousness. This study protocol describes an adaptation of the motion-induced blindness paradigm: an active condition where participants direct their gaze toward a target after it disappears from consciousness and report its reappearance, versus a passive condition where participants fixate centrally while the stimulus array moves in a replay of active eye-tracking data. Two experiments will compare target reappearance across conditions to evaluate active inference's contribution to conscious awareness.
arXiv Preprint Archive
October 9, 2024
Christopher J. Whyte, Andrew W. Corcoran, Jonathan Robinson et al.
Subjective experience is multifaceted, making consciousness hard to study because traditional theories often focus on isolated aspects like perception or wakefulness and are difficult to compare. This work starts from active inference—a first-principles framework that models behavior as approximate Bayesian inference—and builds toward a minimal theory of consciousness derived from shared features of computational models under active inference. Reviewing models applied to consciousness, the authors argue that these models imply a small set of theoretical commitments pointing to a minimal, testable theory of consciousness.
bioRxiv Preprint Server
February 11, 2020
Christopher J. Whyte, Ryan Smith
preprint
A new computational model called the 'predictive global workspace' combines ideas from the global neuronal workspace (GNW) theory of consciousness with Active Inference, a framework that treats brain activity as Bayesian inference. The model reproduces electrophysiological and behavioral results from studies of inattentional blindness and a four-way taxonomy linking consciousness, attention, and sensory signal strength. It also reconciles conflicting findings, extends the taxonomy to include prior expectations, and suggests new experimental paradigms. The model addresses limitations of current GNW research by enabling precise, testable predictions at both behavioral and neural levels.