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Andrew W. Corcoran

Monash University

3 papers in the library · 3 citations · publishing 2024-2025

Papers

Psilocybin increases optimistic engagement over time: computational modelling of behavior in rats

bioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory) May 17, 2024 Elizabeth L. Fisher, Ryan Smith, Andrew W. Corcoran et al. 2 citations preprint

Rats treated with psilocybin achieved more rewards in a decision-making task, driven by increased task engagement, altered forgetting rates, and reduced loss aversion. Computational modeling of the rats' behavior revealed that psilocybin may induce an optimism bias through changes in how beliefs are updated. This finding has potential relevance for clinical populations characterized by a lack of optimism, such as those with depression.

The role of active inference in conscious awareness

PLoS ONE December 4, 2025 Jonathan Robinson, Andrew W. Corcoran, Christopher J. Whyte et al. 1 citation

Active inference, a framework for modeling how sentient agents behave, is being tested as necessary for changes in conscious content. In an adversarial collaboration, active inference will be contrasted with two other theories that do not require it for consciousness. This study protocol describes an adaptation of the motion-induced blindness paradigm: an active condition where participants direct their gaze toward a target after it disappears from consciousness and report its reappearance, versus a passive condition where participants fixate centrally while the stimulus array moves in a replay of active eye-tracking data. Two experiments will compare target reappearance across conditions to evaluate active inference's contribution to conscious awareness.

On the Minimal Theory of Consciousness Implicit in Active Inference

arXiv Preprint Archive October 9, 2024 Christopher J. Whyte, Andrew W. Corcoran, Jonathan Robinson et al.

Subjective experience is multifaceted, making consciousness hard to study because traditional theories often focus on isolated aspects like perception or wakefulness and are difficult to compare. This work starts from active inference—a first-principles framework that models behavior as approximate Bayesian inference—and builds toward a minimal theory of consciousness derived from shared features of computational models under active inference. Reviewing models applied to consciousness, the authors argue that these models imply a small set of theoretical commitments pointing to a minimal, testable theory of consciousness.