Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
June 20, 2021
Adam Safron
53 citations
Explaining goal-directed behavior may require rethinking mental homunculi and Cartesian theaters as embodied self-models (ESMs)—body maps with agentic properties that function as predictive-memory systems and cybernetic controllers. ESMs are proposed as a major organizing principle for neural architectures, providing foundational inductive biases that constrain inference spaces during cognitive and affective development. Drawing on the Free Energy Principle and Active Inference, the account describes how consciously imagined goal states influence action selection via predictive coding and backward-chained imaginings. Embodied experience supplies empirical priors, and bidirectional linkages between sensory modalities and frontal-parietal control hierarchies infuse perception with somatic-motoric properties, solving frame problems. The manuscript offers neurophenomenological treatments of qualia like pleasure, pain, and desire, and argues that radically embodied minds create foundations for intelligence, consciousness, and will.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
May 30, 2020
Johannes Kleiner
37 citations
Mathematical models of consciousness often lack a clear justification for their formal structure. This article provides that justification by examining what makes phenomenal experience suitable for mathematical representation. It derives a general mathematical framework grounded in the epistemic context of consciousness—specifically, the non-collatability of experience and the structure of phenomenal space. The framework shows how key characteristics of conscious experience imply particular mathematical structures, allowing theory-building to go beyond what standard philosophical methodology alone can achieve. The result is a formal foundation that can guide the development and evaluation of specific mathematical models of consciousness.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
May 14, 2020
Michael Silberstein, William Stuckey
21 citations
The authors argue that conscious experience and fundamental physics are most deeply related through a metaphysical starting point called neutral monism, specifically the variant from William James and Bertrand Russell. Rather than treating physics as fundamental, they derive key features of relativity and quantum mechanics from two axioms grounded in neutral monism, suggesting a unity between these theories. They claim that biases toward property dualism and reductive dynamical explanation create the hard problem of consciousness and the explanatory gap, as well as unresolved issues in physics like the measurement problem and quantum entanglement. The paper aims to resolve these problems and offer a more intuitive model of the relationship between conscious experience and physics.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
February 26, 2025
Lea Gassab, Onur Pusuluk, Marco Cattaneo et al.
8 citations
This perspective article categorizes quantum models of consciousness into three groups based on the brain level at which quantum mechanics might operate: electron delocalization within microtubules, the brain's electromagnetic field, or neurotransmitter-mediated interactions between neurons. The authors focus on the Posner model of cognition, presenting preliminary calculations on how entanglement of phosphate molecules is preserved within the geometric structure of Posner clusters. The work suggests that quantum information theory can improve understanding of brain functions.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
March 27, 2024
Tom Froese
8 citations
The mind and body are one but not the same, related in a way that is efficacious yet non-reducible, non-observable, and non-intelligible. This proposal treats the mind as a hidden 'black box' coupled to the body, introducing two concepts: irruption, where the unobservable mind makes a difference to observable matter, and absorption, where observable matter makes a difference to the unobservable mind. These concepts align with information-theoretic neuroscience, measuring cognitive activity and subjective qualia via entropy and compression respectively. The theory offers responses to the hard problem of consciousness and mental causation from first principles, aiming to set the agenda for future mind sciences.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
July 28, 2020
Matthew Owen
8 citations
Mental causation is central to integrated information theory (IIT), which holds that consciousness exists because it is causally efficacious. This article surveys three problems for mental causation—the lack of psychophysical laws, the causal exclusion problem, and the causal pairing problem—and assesses their threat to IIT under different metaphysical commitments. Three versions of IIT are distinguished: reductive, non-reductive, and non-physicalist. The lack of psychophysical laws appears unthreatening to all versions. Reductive and non-reductive IIT are seriously threatened by the exclusion problem, and it is difficult to see how they could overcome it while maintaining the causal closure principle. Non-physicalist IIT denies that principle but faces the pairing problem, for which a response is briefly outlined. The survey aims to clarify which commitments lead to which problems.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
September 13, 2023
Ivanna Montoya, Daniel Montoya
7 citations
A biologically inspired neural network (BNN) made from human cortical cells learned to predict a digital ball's trajectory and move a paddle, with performance improving as sensory information increased. Among theories of neural correlates of consciousness, only Information Integration Theory (IIT) allows for the possibility that such a BNN could be conscious, because its Φ value is greater than zero. IIT holds that any system capable of integrating information has some degree of phenomenal consciousness. The real-time neural activity responding to environmental stimuli, together with the pattern of increased information density leading to better performance, suggests the BNN could be conscious, raising psychological, philosophical, and ethical questions.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
October 31, 2021
Jonathan W D Mason
7 citations
Phenomenal unity is a key property of consciousness but often poorly defined. This paper introduces model unity: a system has model unity when a single relational model covering the whole system is optimal; otherwise, unity may exist only at a higher level. As part of expected float entropy minimisation theory, relational models interpret system states and may explain why visual experience is unified and why separate people do not share unified consciousness. Four example investigations are given, along with a postulate that distills the foundations of EFE minimisation into a clear statement for evaluating whether it identifies a self-evident fundamental property of consciousness.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
January 19, 2025
Giulio Ruffini, Francesca Castaldo, Jakub Vohryzek
6 citations
Tracking natural data forces an agent to mirror the symmetry properties of the generative world model, enforcing a hierarchical organization in the agent's neural network consistent with the manifold hypothesis. Using Lie pseudogroups to formalize invariance in natural data and drawing parallels to Noether's theorem, the study shows that data tracking constrains both the agent's constitutive parameters and dynamical repertoire. This bridges algorithmic information theory, symmetry, and dynamics, offering insights into neural correlates of agenthood and structured experience, as well as AI and brain model design.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
May 29, 2026
Zoe Lee-Youngzie, Naotsugu Tsuchiya, Michael Robinson et al.
4 citations
A structural approach to consciousness models qualia—the qualities of experience—by examining either the internal organization of parts within an experience or the external relations between experiences. Integrating these two perspectives is a key step toward understanding phenomenally unified global experience. This paper describes both types of structural models and their category-theoretic formalizations, then proposes a sheaf-theoretic framework that maps mereological parts of experience to empirical measures of their qualia. Applying the framework to visual space demonstrates a formal description of experience's structure and conditions for phenomenal unity. The approach supports an empirical research program linking local and global phenomenal qualities.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
October 27, 2020
Adrian Kent
4 citations
A fascinating approach highlights how consciousness and material physics can mutually influence each other through higher-level structures. Using probabilistic toy models based on cellular automata, the exploration involved 100 simulations to illustrate these concepts. The findings suggest that integrating top-down causation could bridge quantum theory with classical physics or general relativity. This perspective aligns with a form of panprotopsychism, proposing that both consciousness and physical phenomena possess dual properties that interact dynamically, offering fresh insights into the nature of reality.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
June 24, 2025
Abir U Igamberdiev
3 citations
Meaningful information is reality in potential form; its actualization increases a system's negentropy. Biological evolution expands meaningful information by generating new coding systems (codepoiesis), where evolutionary changes gain functional value through interpretation that yields a meaningful function. Complexification corresponds to generating new meaningful information and developing new structures with functions. Each biological function has meaning within its environmental context, and the evolutionary search for new meanings establishes sustainable non-equilibrium as an attractor, maximizing power through synergistic effects. At higher organizational levels, innovations emerge as niche construction, behavioral choices, and cognition. The growth of meanings is part of an expanding information system formed by organisms, expanding greatly with consciousness, which incorporates the world's image into knowledge acquisition and enables global civilization.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
August 22, 2023
Rasmus Gahrn-Andersen
3 citations
Resilience, a fundamental property of cognitive systems, is tied to their autopoietic (self-maintaining) organization and helps preserve their identity against disturbances. The autopoietic theory of Maturana and Varela rejects traditional Shannon information as irrelevant to cognition. This paper proposes an alternative: an affordance-based view of information from radical cognitive science that avoids that critique. It argues that social influence on how affordances are used is key to understanding resilience in the informational relations within the human cognitive ecology.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
April 24, 2025
Prakash Chandra Kavi, Gorka Zamora-López, Daniel Ari Friedman et al.
2 citations
A computational model called the Thoughtseeds Framework simulates thought dynamics during focused-attention Vipassana meditation. It treats thoughts as dynamic attentional agents organized in a hierarchy of nested Markov blankets across three levels: knowledge domains, a network where thoughtseeds compete, and meta-cognition that regulates awareness. The model generates four states—breath control, mind wandering, meta-awareness, and redirecting to breath—through self-organizing interactions. Expert meditators sustain control dominance, reinforcing focused attention, while novices show frequent and prolonged mind wandering, reflecting instability. The framework integrates Global Workspace Theory and active inference to explain how meta-awareness shapes a unitary meditative experience, offering testable predictions about meditation skill development.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
March 25, 2025
Chris Percy, Andrés Gómez-Emilsson
2 citations
Neuroscientific theories of consciousness must address how separate micro-units of information combine into a single, unified conscious experience—the phenomenal binding problem. This paper examines how Integrated Information Theory (IIT) v4.0 offers a solution by proposing that particular entities called 'complexes' define existence. While this works in a static framework, it creates difficulties when applied to dynamic systems. The authors identify a dilemma for IIT: non-local entity transitions versus contiguous selves, termed the 'dynamic entity evolution problem.' Three potential ways IIT could dissolve this dilemma are described. The paper contributes to IIT's shift from static to dynamic analysis.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
January 28, 2025
Francis Heylighen, Shima Beigi
1 citation
Local prospect theory (LPT) proposes that consciousness relies on uncertainty, not just accurate prediction. The brain creates a "local prospect"—a range of possible futures shaped by subjective experience—from which an agent freely chooses how to respond. Consciousness is a self-sustaining loop of neural activity that forms a temporary working memory, allowing thoughts and feelings from different brain modules to interact non-linearly, unlike automatic unconscious processes. Entropy-based measures, such as the determination of actions by conditions and the breadth of prospect, quantify the range of considered possibilities. The framework explains Buddhist mindfulness and meditation as broadening consciousness and reducing automatic reactions by lessening conditioning. The prospect measure could be operationalized through action variety, perception breadth, and behavioral unpredictability for empirical testing.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
September 5, 2024
Don M Tucker, Phan Luu
Intelligence arises from patterns of connections among neurons, whether in brains or machines. Brains develop continuously as experience shapes their neural connections. Active inference theory suggests that sentient systems organize themselves by minimizing free energy, a process of informatic self-evidencing. This implies that the mind can be described in information terms independent of its physical substrate. At a certain complexity level, self-evidencing becomes hierarchical and reentrant, leading to consciousness as a good regulator. These principles indicate that adequate reconstruction of an individual human brain's computational dynamics is possible through neuromorphic computational emulation.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
May 28, 2024
Hartmut Neven, Adam Zalcman, Peter Read et al.
Conscious experience may emerge from quantum mechanical superpositions, a groundbreaking idea that suggests the structure of these superpositions shapes our experiences. This theory posits that quantum entanglement resolves the binding problem, creating a unified phenomenal experience. In a proposed series of experiments involving brain organoids and xenon anesthesia, the aim is to explore these connections further. With a focus on brain-computer interfaces, this approach could potentially enhance human consciousness, offering innovative avenues for understanding the physical substrate of consciousness.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
January 31, 2024
Pavel Kraikivski
The brain creates its own internal representations of time and space, which may differ from external time and space. This work presents a mechanistic model of interconnected processes that encode phenomenal representations of space and time, elaborating how these processes bind together. A stochastic version of the model explores how binding strength interacts with noise, using spectral entropy to characterize noise effects. Results show that spectral entropy values for strongly bound systems are similar to those for weakly bound or decoupled systems, indicating that the binding mechanism is resilient to noise.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
January 9, 2023
Donald D Hoffman, Chetan Prakash, Robert Prentner
Conscious subjects and experiences are entities beyond spacetime, not within it. Their dynamics are described by Markov chains. Agents can combine into more complex agents, fuse into simpler agents, and qualia fuse to create new qualia. The possible dynamics of n agents form an n(n-1)-dimensional polytope with n^n vertices, the Markov polytope M_n. The total fusions of n agents and qualia form an (n-1)-dimensional simplex, the fusion simplex F_n. Projecting these dynamics onto spacetime yields scattering processes: a new map from Markov chains to decorated permutations encodes physical information for scattering amplitudes. Spacetime and scattering processes are a data structure coding for interactions of conscious agents; a particle in spacetime is a projection of the Markovian dynamics of a communicating class of conscious agents.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
September 18, 2021
Garrett Mindt
The hard problem of consciousness challenges scientific explanations of subjective experience. Central to it is the structure and dynamics (S&D) argument, which David Chalmers used to claim that physical accounts cannot explain phenomenal experience. This essay argues that Chalmers' S&D argument relies on a limited conception of extrinsic structure and dynamics. Drawing on complexity sciences and Integrated Information Theory (IIT), the author introduces intrinsic structure and dynamics as a broader class of properties. These properties may naturally and scientifically explain phenomenal experience and the relationship between syntactic, semantic, and intrinsic information. The hope is to vindicate certain explanations from the S&D argument and dissolve the hard problem by showing that not all structure and dynamics are equal.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
May 22, 2021
Jon Mallatt
Two theories of consciousness are compared: Integrated Information Theory (IIT) and Neurobiological Naturalism (NN). IIT defines consciousness as integrated information (phi-max) and claims even simple systems with interacting parts possess some consciousness. Its strengths include logical axioms, mathematical formalism, an experience-first approach, avoidance of the mind-body problem, consistency with evolution, and testable predictions. A weakness is that some logic-based reasoning was not checked against hard evidence during construction. NN incorporated evidence earlier, is less mature and less formalized, but has identified neural correlates of consciousness and offers a scientific-method roadmap for future study.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
May 8, 2021
Pavel Kraikivski
Random fluctuations in neuronal processes may contribute to variability in perception and increase information capacity in neuronal networks. This paper develops a stochastic model to examine how noise affects dynamical systems that mimic neural correlates of consciousness. Power spectral densities and spectral entropy values were computed for systems with varying numbers of mutually connected processes. Spectral entropy decreased linearly as the number of processes doubled, and power spectral density frequencies shifted to higher values with increasing system size, indicating a greater impact of negative feedback loops and regulation in larger systems. The results suggest that large dynamical systems of mutually connected and negatively regulated processes are more robust against inherent noise than small systems.
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)
January 11, 2021
Diana Stanciu
Epistemic structural realism (ESR) offers a feasible philosophical background for the interdisciplinary study of consciousness and its associated neurophysiological phenomena in neuroscience and cognitive science, while also accounting for the mathematical structures involved. Applying ESR principles to neurophysiological phenomena related to conscious free choice and alterations of consciousness (AOCs) from pathologies like epilepsy adds explanatory value. This approach aligns with Quine's idea that philosophy is continuous with science. ESR can resonate with scientific models such as the global neuronal workspace model and integrated information theory. Unlike ontic structural realism, ESR is more suitable because it avoids the ontological question of what consciousness is and focuses instead on what can be known about it.