Manuscrito
March 22, 2022
Nara Miranda de Figueiredo, Elena Clare Cuffari
4 citations
This paper argues that sign-based semantics can be freed from reliance on mental content by combining linguistic enactivism with insights from cognitive archeology. The authors accept Duffley's methodological use of corpus analysis but reject his ontological commitment to mental content. They propose that meaningful material engagement, as studied in cognitive archeology, shows how sign-using emerges as an enactive capacity—a practical, embodied skill rather than a mental representation. This reframing preserves the empirical rigor of corpus analysis while grounding meaning in situated, material interactions.
Manuscrito
December 20, 2021
G. Rodrigo Benevides B.
2 citations
William James argues that mystical states of consciousness form the root of all religions. Despite his own admission of being personally shut out from such experiences, he contends that the practical developments of mysticism within institutionalized religions demonstrate the reality of these states. This stance is supported by his pragmatist philosophy, which evaluates ideas by their practical consequences. The paper examines both the nature of mysticism and James's pragmatist view of religion.
Manuscrito
March 22, 2022
Cesar Fernando Meurer
1 citation
Embodied semantics, which grounds meaning in bodily simulation, and Duffley's sign-based semantics can complement each other as foundational and semantic theories respectively. The argument examines three areas—analysis of FOR, verbs of positive and negative recall, and causative verbs—where Duffley's approach gains support from embodied simulation. Conversely, Duffley's theory may help address two challenges facing embodied semantics: accounting for abstract language and sentence-level simulations. The paper proposes a mutually beneficial relationship between these two theoretical frameworks.
Manuscrito
December 17, 2024
John Barnden
A new challenge targets consciousness theories that require conscious processes to involve causation patterned in a specific way, including Integrated Information Theory, Global Workspace theories, and a type of Higher-Order Thought theory. The challenge is that the causal pattern itself is not required for the effects those processes have on the organism's other aspects, making the property of being conscious dispensable in accounting for those effects. This raises operational and evolutionary problems. The paper proposes meeting the challenge by introducing meta-causation, where causation acts on causation instances themselves, allowing instances of causation in conscious processes to be causes of effects elsewhere. The author also summarizes previous motivation for meta-causation as the basis of consciousness.