Disjunctivism, the view that no single feature is common to all mental phenomena, has become more appealing as other proposals for a mark of the mental face difficulties. A revised form of disjunctivism is developed that avoids traditional problems. On this account, all mental states exemplify either intentional presentationality or phenomenal presentationality (or both). These two features are irreducible to each other but are species of the common genus of presentationality: presenting something to the subject. This presentationality uniformly marks the mental domain. The account is labeled 'sui generis disjunctivism' because it is in the spirit but not the letter of disjunctivism.
Phenomenal intentionality theory holds that the aboutness of mental states arises from conscious experience. This view inherits two classic philosophical problems: skepticism about the external world and the difficulty of reconciling mind with nature. The author draws a parallel between this theory and Husserlian phenomenology, which faces the same challenges. By examining the temporal structure of phenomenal intentionality through phenomenology and combining it with panqualityism—a form of neutral monism—the author argues that phenomenal intentionality can be naturalized in a specific sense, offering a way out of both skepticism and the naturalism problem.