The paper proposes a 'second epochē': a methodological gesture that, alongside the classical suspension of 'belief in the world,' additionally suspends the assumption of a necessary intentional structure of consciousness. This opens phenomenological analysis to descriptions of experiences without a clear subject–object relation (contemplative, micro-phenomenological, and pre-reflective states). The core of the work articulates three ontological figures of such consciousness: (1) Henry's auto-affective immanence of life as self-manifestation without distance; (2) Buddhist non-dual awareness (rigpa) as a 'luminous' presence without an object; (3) the late-Husserlian pre-reflective core of time and affectivity as the condition of possibility...
Mystical experiences of the holy and infinite resemble sensory perception in their essential features, according to a philosophical argument defending William Alston's view that some mystical experiences are genuinely perceptual. The paper examines the Christian mystical tradition's concept of spiritual senses, as developed by Origen, Karl Rahner, and Hans Urs von Balthasar. It discusses the phenomenal qualities of such experiences and the role of emotions in mystical cognition. While analytical methods have limited ability to confirm or articulate these largely ineffable experiences, the author argues this limitation is not philosophically problematic. The conclusion affirms that mystical experiences share key features with sensory perception.