The article defends an argument from hallucination based on the conceivability of philosophical hallucinations that involve no phenomenal difference from genuine perception. It is essentially a thought-experiment argument supporting the thesis that subjective indistinguishability of the two states implies identity of their objects. The author considers counterexamples and disjunctivist objections to this inference and extends the discussion to the conditions involved in imagining philosophical hallucinations. By sufficiently narrowing the 'gap' between the thesis of subjective indistinguishability and the thesis of identity of objects, the author responds to Putnam's objection based on the phenomenal sorites and related problems. A more detailed analysis of the conditions involved in the thought experiment shows that some common objections to the inference from subjective indistinguishability to identity of objects lose their force.
Mystical experiences of the holy and infinite resemble sensory perception in their essential features, according to a philosophical argument defending William Alston's view that some mystical experiences are genuinely perceptual. The paper examines the Christian mystical tradition's concept of spiritual senses, as developed by Origen, Karl Rahner, and Hans Urs von Balthasar. It discusses the phenomenal qualities of such experiences and the role of emotions in mystical cognition. While analytical methods have limited ability to confirm or articulate these largely ineffable experiences, the author argues this limitation is not philosophically problematic. The conclusion affirms that mystical experiences share key features with sensory perception.