Higher-order theories of consciousness and what-it-is-like-ness.
Philosophical studies January 1, 2018 Jonathan Farrell 26 citations
Ambitious higher-order theories of consciousness claim to explain conscious states in terms of what-it-is-like-ness. This paper examines two arguments that bear on this claim: the misrepresentation argument, which suggests that radical misrepresentation leads to a contradiction, and the awareness argument, which aims to support higher-order theories by asserting that subjects are aware of all their conscious states. The paper shows that higher-order theorists can adopt a specific reading of what-it-is-like-ness and there being something it is like that seems to address both arguments. However, on this reading, the awareness argument provides no support for ambitious theories, and the response to the misrepresentation argument simply ignores it. The paper concludes that higher-order theories cannot account for what-it-is-like-ness.