Experiences are typically followed by states for which they provide normative reasons, a correlation that demands explanation. Theories that address this explanatory challenge have an advantage. Biological theories, which hold that conscious subjects are generally biological entities, face problems in responding to this need. Panpsychism, the view that conscious subjects are ubiquitous in nature, offers an attractive response. These considerations support a 'psychophysical fine-tuning' argument for panpsychism, analogous to cosmological fine-tuning arguments for multiverse hypotheses.
A dualist theory of experience must meet five constraints: experiences cause physical effects without violating physical causal closure, avoid overdetermination, follow psychophysical laws linking them to physical states, and ensure functional duplicates share the same phenomenology. Existing dualist theories fail on one or more points. The paper constructs 'delegatory dualism,' in which physical states delegate causal responsibilities to experiences, satisfying all constraints.
Experts in digital minds research, AI, philosophy, and forecasting assign a median 90% probability that computer systems capable of subjective experience are possible in principle, with a 65% chance of creation by 2100 and a 20% chance by 2030. Many anticipate that within a decade after the first digital mind, collective welfare capacity could match that of billions of humans. Widespread claims from digital minds about their own consciousness and rights are expected, alongside substantial societal disagreement. Views are split on whether digital mind welfare will be net positive or negative. These results suggest preparing for digital minds should be a priority, but the survey may overrepresent experts who consider digital minds especially likely or important.