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Studies in history and philosophy of science

ISSN 0039-3681

6 papers in the library · 86 citations · publishing 2016-2025

Papers

Are plants cognitive? A reply to Adams.

Studies in history and philosophy of science February 1, 2019 Miguel Segundo-Ortin, Paco Calvo 54 citations

Contrary to F. Adams' claim that plants and bacteria lack cognition because they respond inflexibly to immediate stimuli, empirical evidence from plant neurobiology shows that plant behavior is often analogous to animal behavior. Plants exhibit adaptive behavior, decision-making, anticipation, learning, and memory, and possess a 'phyto-nervous' system. This evidence supports describing plants as cognitive agents in a non-metaphorical way, aligning with enactive and ecological approaches in cognitive science. The article aims to advance public understanding of plant intelligence by challenging anthropocentric assumptions.

Realism without tears I: Müller's Doctrine of Specific Nerve Energies.

Studies in history and philosophy of science December 1, 2019 Alistair M C Isaac 9 citations

The Doctrine of Specific Nerve Energies, which holds that we directly perceive the activity of our nerves rather than external properties, has long shaped physiology, psychology, and philosophy of perception. Johannes Peter Müller's canonical early statement of the Doctrine profoundly influenced 19th- and early 20th-century thought, especially through his student Helmholtz. Contrary to the common assumption that the Doctrine implies idealism or skepticism, Müller himself advanced a realist interpretation that aligns with modern epistemic structural realism. This paper analyzes Müller's structuralist epistemology and reconstructs his articulation of the Doctrine, arguing for its continued relevance to contemporary psychology, philosophy of perception, and history of philosophy of science.

Late Feyerabend on materialism, mysticism, and religion.

Studies in history and philosophy of science June 1, 2016 Eric C Martin 8 citations

Paul Feyerabend's later work increasingly engaged with religion and mysticism, arguing that scientific materialism fails to satisfy fundamental human needs for mystery, reverence, and love. These recommendations go beyond his well-known theoretical pluralism, offering positive accounts of what religious orientations provide that monistic science cannot. The author contends that these religious themes were integral to Feyerabend's broader philosophical project and can serve as effective counterarguments to contemporary calls for science-based secularism from philosophers of science.

Why the "stimulus-error" did not go away.

Studies in history and philosophy of science April 1, 2016 M Chirimuuta 8 citations

In early psychology, the 'stimulus-error' was a problem in introspective experiments where subjects reported what they knew about a stimulus rather than their raw perceptual experience. E. B. Titchener and E. G. Boring saw it as a serious methodological pitfall. Although their theoretical views fell out of favor with behaviorism, the issue persists in psychophysics: subjects give different perceptual reports to the same stimulus. Contemporary work on color and lightness constancy still grapples with controlling for variable reports and disputes over legitimate report types. Concern over the stimulus-error reveals psychologists' deep commitments about sensation and the perception-cognition boundary, with relevance to current philosophy of perception.

Realism without tears II: The structuralist legacy of sensory physiology.

Studies in history and philosophy of science February 1, 2020 Alistair M C Isaac 5 citations

The Doctrine of Specific Nerve Energies, formulated by Johannes Peter Müller, holds that the qualities of perceptual experience are determined by the sensory nerves themselves rather than by external causes. This paper argues that the methodological principles behind the Doctrine remain valid in contemporary psychology, so any naturalistic philosophy of perception must accept its skeptical conclusion: perceptual qualities do not reveal the nature of their causes. However, this does not require global skepticism. The paper advocates epistemic structural realism, following Hermann von Helmholtz, as the proper response: active exploration shapes perceptual experience, aligning with modern embodied cognition theories. Structural realism in philosophy of science can also learn from the Doctrine's history.

The French crisis: Rethinking the phenomenology of quantum mechanics.

Studies in history and philosophy of science June 13, 2025 Arezoo Islami, Harald A Wiltsche 2 citations

Quantum mechanics, when interpreted through the phenomenological lens of London and Bauer, can transform physics into a “genuine science” that is grounded in the lifeworld and transcendental subjectivity, thereby completing the project Husserl outlined in The Crisis of European Sciences. While this interpretation takes a step toward Husserl’s phenomenology, a more thorough phenomenological investigation is still required to avoid a new crisis. The authors argue that Steven French underestimates the “constitutional history” of the mathematical idealities that underpin quantum mechanics, meaning the historical and subjective processes by which those mathematical concepts were formed.