Mind-Object Identity: A Solution to the Hard Problem.
Frontiers in psychology January 1, 2019 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00063 via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractA mind-object identity theory is proposed: one's experience of an object is identical with the object itself. The hypothesis is defended by redefining physical objects in terms of relative and actual properties. Cases of misperception like dreams and hallucinations are addressed by redefining the notion of present in relative terms. Both the object and the present are recast as object-relative.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Argument from illusion Consciousness Hallucination Naturalism |
| Key finding | One's experience of an object is identical with the object itself, with both object and present recast as object-relative. |
Abstract
Here I present a mind-object identity theory based on a straightforward hypothesis: One's experience of an object is identical with the object itself. To defend this hypothesis, I will reconsider the notion of a physical object in terms of relative and actual properties. To address cases of misperception such as dreams and hallucinations, I will also reconsider the notion of present in relative terms. Both the object and the present are recast as object-relative.