Frontiers in psychology
January 1, 2020
Zoran Josipovic, Vladimir Miskovic
67 citations
Minimal phenomenal experiences (MPEs) are episodes with greatly reduced phenomenal content and arousal, often considered cases of consciousness-as-such. The authors argue instead that consciousness-as-such is primarily a type of non-conceptual, non-propositional, and nondual awareness—non-representational in nature. This unique kind of awareness cannot be adequately captured by the two-dimensional model of consciousness that combines arousal level with phenomenal content or by mental representations. To understand consciousness-as-such and consciousness more generally, the authors suggest researching it as a distinct kind.
Frontiers in human neuroscience
January 1, 2024
Brian Lord, Joseph L Sanguinetti, Lisannette Ruiz et al.
28 citations
Transcranial focused ultrasound (TFUS) aimed at the posterior cingulate cortex reduces functional connectivity along the midline of the default mode network (DMN) in healthy people. In a randomized, single-blind trial with 30 participants, those receiving active TFUS showed significant connectivity decreases and reported increased state mindfulness, reduced vigor, and temporary changes in sense of self, time, and memory recall. The sham group also showed increased mindfulness but no other subjective effects. TFUS can alter DMN connectivity and subjective experience, suggesting it may serve as a research tool and potential therapeutic intervention.
Zoran Josipovic, Vladimir Miskovic
2 citations
Minimal phenomenal experiences (MPEs), episodes of greatly reduced phenomenal content and arousal, have been proposed as examples of consciousness-as-such. This paper argues that consciousness-as-such is better understood as a unique kind of non-conceptual, non-propositional, nondual awareness that is non-representational. The authors suggest that the standard two-dimensional model of consciousness—arousal level plus phenomenal content—cannot adequately capture this awareness. They propose that consciousness-as-such, and consciousness more broadly, should be studied as a distinct phenomenon.