Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2024
Audrey Vanhaudenhuyse, Marie-Carmen Castillo, Charlotte Martial et al.
7 citations
Auto-induced cognitive trance (AICT) produces richer and more distinct subjective experiences than ordinary rest, auditory stimulation, or imagination. In 27 trained participants, free recalls of experiences were longer during AICT than in other conditions. Text mining identified four distinct classes of discourse, with AICT forming its own class clearly separate from ordinary conscious states. Nine content categories emerged, including nature, animals, body modifications, and difficulty describing thoughts. AICT was specifically characterized by reports of nature, animals, body modifications, and difficulty describing thoughts. These findings indicate that AICT generates a unique and richer phenomenology compared to other conscious states.
Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2024
Justin Riddle, Jonathan W Schooler
7 citations
Although we intuitively feel we have a single, unified conscious experience, we often face indecision, hold contradictory beliefs, or engage in internal debates. The Nested Observer Windows (NOW) Model proposes that consciousness is hierarchical: information processed across many spatiotemporal scales of the brain feeds into subjective experience. It likens the mind to a hierarchy of nested mosaic tiles, where each tile is itself an image made of smaller tiles. Unitary consciousness sits at the apex, where perceptual constructs become fully integrated and complex behaviors are initiated. The model defines observer windows as spatially and temporally constrained systems that integrate information.
Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2025
Chris Fields, Mahault Albarracin, Karl Friston et al.
6 citations
The free-energy principle (FEP) constrains possible models of consciousness, especially those of attentional control and imaginative experiences like episodic memory and planning. The paper first reviews classical and quantum formulations of the FEP, focusing on multi-component systems where only some parts interact directly with the environment. It discusses internal boundaries structured as Markov blankets, which act as classical information channels. The analysis shows how this framework supports models of attention and imagination, explaining how imaginative experience can use the same spatio-temporal and object-recognition frames as ordinary perception, and how it can be internally generated yet still surprising. The paper concludes with implications for implementation, phenomenology, phylogeny, and the large variability of imaginative experience in humans.
Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2024
Brian Key, Deborah J Brown
6 citations
Internal feeling states like pain, hunger, and thirst are often assumed to directly cause behaviors essential for survival, but this 'causal assumption' conflicts with the standard neuroscientific view of motor action. The authors argue that denying feelings cause behavior does not necessarily lead to epiphenomenalism, which would contradict evolutionary biology. Instead, they propose the 'sense making sense' hypothesis: the function of subjective experience is not to cause behavior but to explain it, in a restricted sense. This framework integrates neural computations for motor control, feelings, and explanatory processes to account for how feelings contribute to our understanding of why we act.
Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2023
Julian Kiverstein, Mark Miller
6 citations
Playfulness, understood as a learned high-level prior that tolerates and explores uncertainty in safe contexts, can contribute to human flourishing by expanding the amount of surprise a person is prepared to accept. Playful individuals attend to the world in an open, expansive, and effortless way that fosters presence and deep engagement, leading to renewed appreciation for life. They actively seek challenges at the edge of their abilities, promoting growth in skills and relationships. Additionally, they monitor and learn from their own affective responses to uncertainty, turning it into something familiar and enjoyable to explore. Thus, openness to uncertainty may be an important ingredient in a meaningful life.
Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2025
Daniel J Morris, D Blaise Elliott, S Gabriela Torres-Platas et al.
3 citations
Combining virtual reality (VR) with lucid dreaming—awareness during a dream—can produce immersive experiences that may deepen effects from VR alone. In a small pilot study, four frequent lucid dreamers experienced a VR simulation called Ripple, which prior research found reduces self-other boundaries and enhances feelings of interconnectedness. After two VR sessions, sounds from Ripple were played during REM sleep. Three participants had lucid dreams about Ripple, and all four reported dream elements from the VR experience. Real-time physiological signals confirmed lucidity and dreaming about the VR content. The findings suggest that lucid dreaming can recapitulate and potentially amplify the psychological impact of prior VR experiences.
Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2025
Ishan Singhal, Narayanan Srinivasan
3 citations
Awareness of visual stimuli unfolds across multiple timescales, not just one. Using continuous flash suppression (CFS) with flicker rates of 1, 4, 10, and 25 Hz, four experiments with 48 participants showed that different flicker frequencies maximally disrupted distinct aspects of awareness: entry into awareness, attentional sampling, perceptual grouping, and exit from awareness each had a unique vulnerable flicker rate. These results suggest that temporal hierarchies in perception correspond to multiple timescales of conscious processing, challenging single-timescale theories of consciousness.
Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2024
Iris Berent
3 citations
Consciousness is often considered a 'hard problem' because it seems distinct from the physical world. This view relies on the assumptions that people do not see consciousness as physical and that their intuitions accurately reflect reality. New experiments challenge both assumptions: in some scenarios, people view consciousness as a physical process occurring in the brain, and intuitions about the problem are linked to psychological biases, making them unreliable. The author concludes that the 'hard problem' has psychological roots, and resolving it requires understanding the mechanisms that produce these intuitions.
Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2025
Cemre Yilmaz, Laura Pabel, Elias Kerschenbauer et al.
2 citations
Perceptual transitions during binocular rivalry take many distinct forms, not just a simple alternation between two images. In 52 participants viewing pairs of different images, gratings, or moving dots, content analysis identified 20 unique categories of transition experience. Each person typically reported 2–3 different transition types per stimulus pair, and these categories remained consistent for the same observer over time but varied across individuals and stimulus content. The findings indicate that subjective visual experience during rivalry is richer and more complex than traditional discrete-response paradigms capture, and they suggest that neuroimaging studies of binocular rivalry may produce different results depending on how transitions are experienced.
Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2025
Francesco Ellia, Naotsugu Tsuchiya
2 citations
A commentary argues that recent computational functionalist theories of consciousness, while making a welcome structural turn, largely echo predictions already made by Integrated Information Theory. The authors question whether key claims—about subjective experience, local lateral connectivity in sensory areas, and the role of silent units—are coherent within the functionalist paradigm. They emphasize the need to distinguish genuine predictions from post-hoc accommodations in consciousness science.
Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2024
Keiichi Onoda, Hiroyuki Akama
2 citations
The Integrated Information Theory proposes that consciousness arises from the integration of information within a system, and the degree of consciousness depends on the extent of that integration. When consciousness is lost, the core complex of consciousness disintegrates and Φ measures, reflecting integrated information, diminish. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging of global brain networks during tasks and sleep, the authors discovered that a complex within the frontoparietal network remained constant across tasks, but its regional distribution collapsed in early sleep. Φ measures decreased as sleep progressed under limited analysis conditions. These findings align with and support the theory's predictions.
Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2026
Alicia Franco-Martínez, Ricardo Rey-Sáez, Jesús Adrián-ventura et al.
1 citation
Working memory may operate on unconscious perceptual contents, though it remains linked to conscious perception. A large, multisite replication (19 labs, 531 participants, 720 trials) of Soto et al. (2011) found above-chance accuracy (.55) on a visual discrimination task when participants reported not seeing the subliminal Gabor grating. Performance correlated positively with cue detection sensitivity (r = .228), and the regression intercept was significantly above chance (β₀ = .521). The study provides an open-access dataset and confirms that measures were reliable and valid, supporting the existence of unconscious working memory.
Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2026
Kiana Ward
1 citation
Non-dual awareness (NDA) is a shift in consciousness where the subject-object distinction dissolves and experience is no longer structured by conceptual thought or goal-directed control. The article argues that constraint closure, as developed by Nave, extends the enactivist model of autonomy by showing how autonomy is sustained through the continual regeneration of its own relational conditions, preventing process-closure models from being read in substantialist terms. This view parallels Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka analysis of dependent origination. The author proposes that NDA corresponds to a shift from decoupled to precarious constraints, revealing that cognition and awareness persist through dynamic regeneration of interdependent relations, not intrinsic foundations.
Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2025
Robert Worden
1 citation
A computer cannot be conscious. If the brain is only a neural computer, brains cannot be conscious. Consciousness implies something else happening in the brain beyond computation. In a running computer, information about outside events is encoded to enable computation, but the information needed to decode that encoding (e.g., to interpret volts as bits) is not inside the computer; meaning is defined only by an external entity. Similarly, a book’s meaning requires outside knowledge to read. Consciousness contains meaningful information about external events, but a computer without decoding contains none. Therefore, if the brain is only a computer, consciousness cannot be realized by events inside the brain. The paper suggests an analogue model of 3-D space as a possible source of consciousness, meriting further investigation.
Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2025
Anne Monnier, Lena Adel, Guillaume Dumas
1 citation
Lived experience is shaped by intersubjective, social, cultural, and historical dimensions. Neurophenomenology, which integrates first-person experiential and third-person neurobehavioural perspectives, reveals mutual constraints between them. This article argues the scientific community is ready to adopt a generative neurophenomenology, clarifying three meanings of 'generative' as applied to phenomenology, passages, and models. It proposes combining methods: transitioning from individual to multiple people phenomenology, expanding neuroscience to include multimodal interpersonal synchrony, and leveraging computational tools to integrate viewpoints. It underscores that using computational approaches does not endorse computationalism. Clinical relevance is illustrated with case studies in autism and family therapy, demonstrating translational potential.
Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2024
Andy Mckilliam
1 citation
The neuroscience of consciousness has traditionally aimed to identify the minimal neural conditions sufficient for conscious experience. This paper argues for a shift to a mechanistic approach that seeks neural difference-makers—components that causally contribute to consciousness—rather than merely sufficient conditions. It clarifies how the mutual manipulability criterion can distinguish constitutive parts of a mechanism from merely causal influences. Applying this framework to debates about the prefrontal cortex, the author contends that the prefrontal cortex qualifies as part of the neural mechanisms underlying consciousness, even if it is not strictly necessary for every instance of consciousness.
Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2024
Mads Jørgensen Hansen
1 citation
A multidimensional framework for studying consciousness has recently been introduced, allowing finer distinctions among global states such as psychedelic states, disorders of consciousness, and animal consciousness. This paper expands the model by adding temporal profiles, which capture how consciousness changes over an organism's life cycle and how disorders of consciousness progress over time. The expansion enables new comparisons across developmental stages and across species, and it highlights the need for greater attention to fluctuations in patients with disorders of consciousness.
Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2026
Jonas Mago, George Deane, Lars Sandved-Smith et al.
People under the influence of psychedelics often report encountering autonomous entities such as spirits, elves, or ancestors. A neurocomputational model, grounded in the active inference framework, explains these experiences by proposing that psychedelics reduce the predictability of sensory perceptions, leading the brain to interpret both internal and external perceptions as coming from non-self agents. The model synthesizes earlier theories including the entropic brain model, computational accounts of felt presence, and sensory attenuation theories of self-other discrimination. It aims to account for how the brain supports entity encounters and for the diversity and similarity of these experiences across cultural contexts.
Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2026
Ronald Sladky
Consciousness is often thought to be centered on the self, with the insular cortex and subcortical regions supporting self-modeling and motivation. However, reports of minimal phenomenal experience (MPE) describe states without any self-referential content, challenging this ego-centric view. This theoretical paper proposes a dual-origin theory of cortical development to explain this duality. The 'Amygdala-System', expanding from the amygdala and olfactory system, supports interoceptive self-modeling and ego-centric processing. In contrast, the 'Hippocampus-System', centered on the hippocampus, supports allocentric cognition and selfless experiences, akin to an 'endless ocean'. MPE may be a fragile form of consciousness typically overshadowed by the Amygdala-System. Real-time fMRI neurofeedback could upregulate the Hippocampus-System to enable controlled study of MPE.
Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2026
Sneha K S Sheth, Mike Doswell, Kalina Christoff Hadjiilieva et al.
Over the past 25 years, neuroscience has focused on perceptual consciousness, but the dynamic experience of the stream of thought—first described by William James—has received less attention. The Dynamic Framework of Thought (DFT) provides a taxonomy of thought dynamics. This study used four experiments, including laboratory, online, and fMRI-based settings, to test whether people can introspectively access and distinguish two thought dimensions: freely moving and deliberately directed. In all experiments, participants reported their thought dynamics during a probed resting period with eyes open. Using mixed methods, the findings suggest that individuals have some introspective access to these dynamics.
Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2026
Juliette Gélébart, Alexandre Fouré, Romain Quentin et al.
Hypnotic induction and ideomotor suggestions reorganize brain connectivity and subjective experience in distinct ways. Using EEG, cardiorespiratory monitoring, and first-person reports, the study tracked changes across resting baseline, hypnotic induction, and an ideomotor challenge (suggested arm rigidity versus voluntary simulation). Induction produced gradual parieto-occipital alpha suppression, increased theta activity, enhanced frontoparietal theta connectivity, and reduced parasympathetic cardiac modulation, indicating active top-down network reorganization. During the ideomotor challenge, participants fell into two behavioral groups—tremblers and non-tremblers—despite both reporting disrupted agency. Tremblers showed increased frontoparietal gamma and reduced delta connectivity, consistent with enhanced sensorimotor prediction error signaling under motor conflict. The findings support predictive coding and dissociation accounts of agency disruption.
Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2025
Jasmine Walter, Thomas Andrillon, Jennifer M Windt
Spontaneous thoughts and experiences (STE), such as mind wandering and dreaming, may occur in patients with disorders of consciousness (DoC). The evidence is indirect and inconclusive, but suggests STE could affect diagnosis, which currently focuses on detecting consciousness. Understanding these experiences might also illuminate subjective experience and quality of life in DoC, about which little is known. Because diagnostic decisions can have life-or-death consequences, it is important to use measures sensitive to internally directed conscious experiences. Further research is needed to explore STE in DoC and its implications for quality of life.
Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2025
Catherine Prueitt, Idil Sezer, Matthew D Sacchet
Pain is an allostatic imperative that commands an organism to adapt a part of its body. Drawing on empirical studies of pain reprocessing during advanced meditation, allostatic paradigms of biological self-regulation, and the philosophy of pain in the classical Sanskrit Pratyabhijñā Śaivism tradition, this paper theorizes two components of an allostatic response: homeostatic responses, which are error-corrective and aim to return to a previous stable state, and heterostatic responses, which are anticipatory and shift to a new steady state to better prepare for future challenges. Successful adaptation depends on both error-correction and anticipatory change. A broad range of affect properly accompanies pain, and the model may extend to mental pain.
Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2025
Shaked Palgi, Tamara Bester-Arest, Nathan Faivre et al.
Unconscious mental processing may not extend to integrating relationships between objects. In five experiments, participants viewed pairs of objects that were either related (e.g., a lock and key) or unrelated, presented either visibly or invisibly through masking. When pairs were visible, behavioral priming and a larger N400 brain response occurred for unrelated versus related pairs, indicating relational processing. When pairs were invisible—verified by subjective and objective awareness measures—no differences in N400 amplitude were found, and decoding of pair relations from brain activity was no better than chance. The results suggest that consciousness is needed for integrating relationships beyond single objects, supporting theories that emphasize consciousness's role in relational integration.
Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2025
João Patriota, Giulia Moreni, Jorge F Mejias et al.
During the sleep-wake cycle, consciousness changes, and this is thought to relate to how brain areas integrate. Recent work found that people can have conscious experiences during NREM sleep, which is usually considered unconscious. This study tested whether functional connectivity between neurons varies within brain states in a way that matches fluctuating consciousness. Researchers examined directed functional connectivity between neurons across the wake-sleep cycle in rats, over seconds. They observed that NREM sleep contains epochs where inter-areal connectivity patterns resemble those during wakefulness and REM sleep, and vice versa. Thus, circuit-level connectivity patterns are not fixed by brain state but may reflect other factors, such as changes in consciousness level within as well as between brain states.