Review of philosophy and psychology
January 1, 2022
Maxwell J D Ramstead, Anil K Seth, Casper Hesp et al.
75 citations
A version of neurophenomenology is presented that uses generative modelling techniques from computational neuroscience and biology to formally model descriptions of lived experience from the phenomenological tradition (e.g., Husserl, Merleau-Ponty). The approach, called computational phenomenology, is situated within the broader project of naturalizing phenomenology. Philosophical objections to that project are evaluated, and the generative modelling framework is reviewed. The approach differs from previous uses of generative modelling for consciousness by constructing computational models of inferential or interpretive processes that best explain particular kinds of lived experience.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
January 1, 2023
Inês Hipólito, Jonas Mago, Fernando E. Rosas et al.
60 citations
Psychedelic therapy shows promise for mental health, but the psychological mechanisms behind its benefits are unclear. This paper proposes that psychedelics act as destabilizers, both psychologically and neurophysiologically, drawing on the 'entropic brain' hypothesis and the 'RElaxed Beliefs Under pSychedelics' model. Using complex systems theory, it suggests that psychedelics disrupt fixed points or attractors, breaking reinforced patterns of thinking and behavior. The approach explains how increased brain entropy destabilizes neurophysiological set points, leading to new understandings of psychedelic psychotherapy. These insights have implications for reducing risks and optimizing treatment during both the peak experience and the subacute recovery period.
George Deane, Jonas Mago, Aikaterini Fotopoulou et al.
7 citations
preprint
A computational theory called adaptive narrative control explains how subpersonal processes shape conscious experience to enable adaptive behavior. Systems with an attention schema can anticipate the epistemic and pragmatic consequences of attentional states, using mental action—endogenous control of attention—to regulate affective states. This capacity also produces avoidant mental action or motivated inattention, which is argued to be a core mechanism underlying psychopathology, leading to rigid belief formation, reduced emotional recognition (alexithymia), and decreased subjective well-being under certain environmental conditions. The account partially echoes Freudian defense mechanisms and introduces a computational unconscious. It refines the REBUS model of psychedelic therapy and explains improvements in well-being from meditation.
American journal of human biology : the official journal of the Human Biology Council
December 1, 2024
Josh Brahinsky, Jonas Mago, Mark Miller et al.
5 citations
Buddhist Jhāna meditation and Christian speaking in tongues, despite appearing very different, share key phenomenological features. Interviews with experienced practitioners in the USA reveal a dynamic interplay between focused attention, aroused joy, and a sense of letting go or release crucial to both practices. The paper theorizes that these shared features engage an autonomic field built through a spiral between attention, arousal, and release (AAR), analyzed through sensory gating and predictive processing theories of brain function.
arXiv (Cornell University)
May 15, 2026
Jonas Mago, Edmundo Lopez-Sola, Jakub Vohryzek et al.
States of consciousness with minimal phenomenal content, such as those induced by certain meditation practices, show increased brain entropy similar to high-content psychedelic states, challenging the Entropic Brain Hypothesis that links entropy to phenomenal richness. The Complex Brain Hypothesis resolves this by proposing that brain complexity, not entropy, better indexes the richness of experience. Complexity is modulated by the grain of inference the brain uses to resolve uncertainty: fine-grained inference loosens constraints and proliferates content, as in psychedelic states; coarse-grained inference simplifies experience into contentless awareness, as in minimal phenomenal experiences. Both regimes can elevate entropy but differ in phenomenology and perturbational signatures, refining the Entropic Brain Hypothesis and highlighting minimal phenomenal experiences as a test case for computational theories of consciousness.
Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2026
Jonas Mago, George Deane, Lars Sandved-Smith et al.
People under the influence of psychedelics often report encountering autonomous entities such as spirits, elves, or ancestors. A neurocomputational model, grounded in the active inference framework, explains these experiences by proposing that psychedelics reduce the predictability of sensory perceptions, leading the brain to interpret both internal and external perceptions as coming from non-self agents. The model synthesizes earlier theories including the entropic brain model, computational accounts of felt presence, and sensory attenuation theories of self-other discrimination. It aims to account for how the brain supports entity encounters and for the diversity and similarity of these experiences across cultural contexts.