Enactivism, a view that cognition arises from dynamic interaction with the environment, faces a tension about whether intentionality—the directedness of mental states—involves content after rejecting representationalism. The paper clarifies how enactivists sometimes say intentionality is contentful and sometimes not, and compares this tension to two classic accounts: Husserl's theory of intentionality in the Logical Investigations and Peirce's triadic semiotics. The analysis shows how these historical frameworks illuminate the unresolved issues in enactivist philosophy.
Depressive rumination involves a disruption in the capacity for inner silence, where individuals yearn for but cannot initiate or maintain a quiet inner state. This inability to achieve inner silence explains the distress of rumination and why therapies like meditation are effective. The analysis draws on first-person depression narratives and recent philosophy of psychiatry and psychology to clarify this underexplored phenomenological aspect, which has been overlooked by higher-level analyses of depression.