Cortex; a journal devoted to the study of the nervous system and behavior
April 1, 2014
Quinton Deeley, David A Oakley, Eamonn Walsh et al.
75 citations
Involuntary movements in neuropsychiatric disorders and culturally influenced dissociative states, such as delusions of alien control and spirit possession, involve distinct brain processes. Using fMRI in 15 highly hypnotically susceptible volunteers, suggestions modelled different experiences of loss of self-control: external personal control (like delusions of control), internal personal control (like spirit possession), and impersonal control by a machine (technical delusions). Brain activity and connectivity varied across these conditions.
Schizophrenia Bulletin
August 8, 2018
T. M. Luhrmann, Ben Alderson‐day, Vaughan Bell et al.
74 citations
Trauma can contribute to voice-hearing but is not necessary for it. This article uses ethnographic and other data to show multiple pathways to voice-hearing in both clinical and nonclinical populations, excluding known causes like drugs or epilepsy. Trauma sometimes plays a major role, sometimes a minor role, and sometimes no role at all. Distinct phenomenological patterns in voice-hearing may reflect different salience of trauma for those who hear voices.
PloS one
January 1, 2013
Quinton Deeley, Eamonn Walsh, David A Oakley et al.
48 citations
Voluntary control and awareness of movement are central to selfhood and responsibility, yet can be lost in neuropsychiatric syndromes and dissociative states like spirit possession. Using suggestion and fMRI in 15 highly hypnotically suggestible subjects, loss of perceived control of movements was linked to reduced connectivity between the supplementary motor area (SMA) and motor regions. Reduced awareness of involuntary movements corresponded with less activation in parietal cortices and insula. These results suggest the sense of voluntary control may critically depend on SMA coupling with motor systems, offering a neural basis for narrowed awareness in pathological and culturally influenced dissociative phenomena.
bioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory)
December 19, 2019
J.M. Barnby, Vaughan Bell, Quinton Deeley et al.
4 citations
preprint
Dopamine transmission influences social attributions related to paranoia, but not the salience of paranormal or other beliefs. In a double-blind, placebo-controlled experiment, 27 healthy men received either L-DOPA (150 mg), haloperidol (3 mg), or placebo across three sessions. Haloperidol reduced attributions of harmful intent in a Dictator Game, while L-DOPA reduced such attributions only in fair conditions. Haloperidol unexpectedly increased attributions of self-interest for opponents' decisions. No changes occurred in belief salience for politics, religion, science, morality, or the paranormal. These results suggest dopamine selectively affects social inferences linked to paranoia, independent of mood or skepticism.
Psychopathology
January 1, 2026
Elisavet Pappa, Nichola Raihani, Vaughan Bell
Delusions often involve strong beliefs about illusory social agents, yet the nature and identity of these agents in delusions have been understudied. An analysis of 205 electronic mental health records found that 83.4% of delusions explicitly referenced illusory social agents. Across 238 instances, 220 distinct agent identities were identified, averaging 1.17 agents per record. Most agents were humans (85.1%), commonly family members (31.0%), followed by acquaintances (17.2%), religious figures (13.2%), unnamed persons (12.8%), professionals (11.8%), and cultural figures (10.9%). Hierarchical clustering revealed two groups: socially proximate and socially distant agents. The findings indicate a social gradient in delusions, with socially closer individuals appearing more frequently. This gradient may be a general feature of delusions, not limited to specific syndromes.
Clinical psychological science : a journal of the Association for Psychological Science
June 20, 2017
Vaughan Bell, K. Mills, G. Modinos et al.
A debate about how to study psychosis in cognitive science is addressed. The authors agree with critics that the subjective experience of psychosis, especially the presence of illusory social agents, cannot be reduced to simple cognitive errors. They argue that current social-cognition models neglect this central phenomenological feature. They propose that research should also examine how social agents are represented and deployed, not just how social information is processed. They suggest that intersubjective instability in psychosis may be reorganized into illusory social agents as a best-fit explanation, a hypothesis for future study. They advocate for a phenomenologically informed cognitive science to better understand psychosis.