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Neurosci Conscious

ISSN 2057-2107

12 papers in the library · 205 citations · publishing 2021-2026

Papers

Explanatory profiles of models of consciousness - towards a systematic classification.

Neurosci Conscious August 27, 2021 Camilo Miguel Signorelli, Joanna Szczotka, Robert Prentner 93 citations

Different models of consciousness subscribe to different notions of explanation, use different tools, and aim to explain different phenomena, making direct comparison difficult. A framework is presented that compares models along three minimal dimensions: mode of explanation, mechanisms of explanation, and target of explanation. The approach may help identify driving assumptions, theoretical commitments, and experimental predictions, and points toward more integrative theoretical research where axiomatic models could resolve current contradictions.

Neurophenomenal structuralism. A philosophical agenda for a structuralist neuroscience of consciousness.

Neurosci Conscious August 23, 2022 Holger Lyre 30 citations

Neurophenomenal structuralism proposes that conscious experiences are best understood not as properties of individual neurons but as relationships among neural structures. The framework argues that the brain's self-organized neural maps share a structural, homomorphic mapping with the quality spaces of phenomenal experience. This approach offers a solution to the Newman problem by grounding phenomenal content in spatiotemporal relations rather than intrinsic neural features. It advocates for measurement methods that capture relationships between stimuli, such as similarity ratings and representational geometry. Philosophically, the view entails holism about phenomenal experiences and rules out inverted qualia scenarios, where color experiences could be swapped without behavioral change.

Implicit-explicit gradient of nondual awareness or consciousness as such.

Neurosci Conscious October 8, 2021 Zoran Josipovic 27 citations

Consciousness is often mapped with two dimensions—levels or states on one axis and phenomenal contents on the other—but this conflates awareness with alertness or content, hindering scientific understanding. Nondual awareness, a basic non-conceptual, non-propositional awareness free of subject-object fragmentation, cannot be captured by this two-dimensional map. The author proposes adding an implicit-explicit gradient of nondual awareness as a third axis, indicating how manifest nondual awareness is in any experience regardless of state or content. Alternatively, within a multi-dimensional state space model, nondual awareness can be specified by vectors representing its properties. The paper describes nondual awareness phenomenologically, functionally, and neurally, then explores how this gradient clarifies dualistic and nondual experiences from contemplative practices, substances, or spontaneous occurrences.

Psychedelics and disorders of consciousness: the current landscape and the path forward.

Neurosci Conscious June 15, 2024 Paolo Cardone, Naji Alnagger, Jitka Annen et al. 16 citations

Psychedelic substances, already being tested for psychiatric conditions like depression and PTSD, might also help people with disorders of consciousness caused by brain injury. The article discusses the rationale for using complexity-enhancing psychedelics in post-comatose patients, proposing an optimal level of brain complexity for recovery. It examines how psychedelics and disorders of consciousness may have counterintuitive effects on the default mode network and selfhood. Computational modeling could complement experimental studies to clarify treatment mechanisms and enable personalized medicine. The authors update ethical considerations for this clinical and scientific endeavor.

Exploring the role of structuralist methodology in the neuroscience of consciousness: a defense and analysis.

Neurosci Conscious May 17, 2023 Lukas Kob 15 citations

Structuralist theories in consciousness science focus on the structural properties of phenomenal experience and seek to identify their neural encoding via similarities between quality spaces and neural state spaces. This paper argues that structuralism can be adopted as a methodological approach partly independent of philosophical assumptions about the nature of consciousness. The author situates methodological structuralism within questions of mental representation, psychophysical measurement, holism, and functional relevance of neural processes, and analyzes its relationship to the distinction between conscious and unconscious states. The goal is to make structuralist methodology more accessible to a broader scientific and philosophical audience.

Bayesian theories of consciousness: a review in search for a minimal unifying model.

Neurosci Conscious October 13, 2021 Wiktor Rorot 14 citations

A review of theories of consciousness within Predictive Processing, Active Inference, and the Free Energy Principle suggests that the precision and complexity of an internal generative model are the minimal necessary components for conscious experience. This forms a Minimal Unifying Model of consciousness, synthesizing existing proposals.

Apophatic science: how computational modeling can explain consciousness.

Neurosci Conscious June 16, 2021 Will Bridewell, Alistair M C Isaac 4 citations

A new methodology for consciousness science treats computational models as providing negative data—information about what consciousness is not—rather than positive evidence. This approach avoids metaphysical commitments while supporting quantitative research. It combines computational modeling as an integrative framework across cognitive sciences, echoing Alan Newell's call for computer science concepts as a common language, with a validation method that uses models to constrain theories by ruling out alternatives. The methodology addresses the challenge that consciousness is inherently subjective while scientific data are intersubjective, enabling empirical investigation without resolving philosophical debates.

Computational modelling shows evidence in support of both sensory and frontal theories of consciousness.

Neurosci Conscious September 23, 2025 Kavindu H Bandara, Elise G Rowe, Marta I Garrido 2 citations

The prefrontal cortex's role in consciousness is contested: frontal theories claim it is necessary, while sensory theories argue consciousness arises from the posterior cortex alone, with prefrontal activity only reflecting reporting. Re-analyzing EEG data from 30 participants in a no-report inattentional blindness paradigm, source reconstruction and dynamic causal modeling estimated effective connectivity between prefrontal and posterior regions. A hypothesis-driven analysis found that both theories could explain the data, with a slight preference for frontal theories: a model disabling backward connections within the posterior cortex explained awareness better (53%) than one without backward connections from prefrontal to sensory regions. The findings suggest a subtle but crucial frontal contribution and call for revising current theories.

Learning to attenuate myself: a predictive processing account of body-scan meditation and the dissolution of bodily boundaries.

Neurosci Conscious February 19, 2026 Valeria Becattini, Michael Lifshitz, Mark Miller 1 citation

The article proposes that body-scan meditation, a practice of systematically attending to different parts of the body, can lead to a dissolution of bodily boundaries—a sense of the body's limits becoming less distinct. It uses predictive processing theory, which frames perception as the brain's active inference about sensory input, to explain how such meditation might reduce the precision of predictions about bodily states. By learning to attenuate or down-weight these predictions, practitioners may experience a blurring of the self-other boundary. The account integrates philosophical and neuroscientific perspectives to describe how meditative training can reshape the sense of bodily self.

Against (theory-neutral) method (in consciousness science).

Neurosci Conscious February 16, 2026 Majid D Beni

Scientific investigation of consciousness cannot begin from a theory-neutral foundation. Even approaches that claim to be theory-light rely on substantive background assumptions that cannot be set aside. The aspiration to minimize theory-dependence in favor of pure observation risks collapsing into naïve empiricism. There is no context-independent scientific method that can purge theoretical commitments from the neuroscience of consciousness without significant epistemic cost.

Eigenmodes of the deep unconscious: the neuropsychology of Jungian archetypes and psychedelic experience.

Neurosci Conscious October 18, 2025 Hugh McGovern, Marco Aqil, Selen Atasoy et al.

Archetypes—universal symbols and patterns in the deep unconscious—can be understood through a neuroscientific lens that integrates Carl Jung's theory with the Free Energy Principle and Predictive Processing. The article proposes a three-part interplay among high-level cortex, low-level cortex, and subcortical/affective systems to explain how archetypes arise, especially during altered states like psychedelic experiences. It suggests that archetypes have an affective core in subcortical regions, emerge as imagery in altered states, and are encoded as stories in higher cortical areas. The collective unconscious may develop through social learning and attunement, transmitting archetypes between individuals. This synthesis offers testable hypotheses about the neural basis of archetypes, aiming to validate Jungian concepts and encourage further empirical research.