16 papers in the library · 25 citations · publishing 2018-2026
RUDN Journal of Philosophy December 15, 2022 V. Vasilyev 16 citations
The editor of a thematic journal section on philosophy of mind provides an overview of current research on mind and consciousness, summarizing the articles in the issue and sketching future directions for interdisciplinary and philosophical studies of consciousness.
RUDN Journal of Philosophy June 30, 2022 Asha Mukherjee 3 citations
Jaina ethics and meditation are inseparable, with the entire spiritual path described in the scriptures functioning as a form of meditation. Based on the Tattvartha Sutra, Uttaradhyayana, and Acaranga Sutra, the paper argues that while ethics in a narrow sense is one aspect of meditation, in a broader sense the whole path—including the fourteen stages of spiritual development—can be understood as meditation. Preksha dhyana, a modern adaptation, makes these stages accessible to laypeople while preserving the ultimate goal of self-purification through the karmic cycle.
RUDN Journal of Philosophy January 10, 2023 Igor F. Mikhailov 2 citations
Empirical theories of consciousness remain in a pre-paradigmatic stage, so they do not yet pose an existential threat to the philosophy of consciousness, though they demand its attention. The author clarifies the ambiguous term 'consciousness', separating aspects already open to science and technology from those unlikely to be explained away. The relationship between philosophy and science is analyzed through their inner dynamics of theories and ontologies, showing that the distinction between them is more important for science. Philosophical schemas claiming to be 'experiential' must meet criteria for empirical theories to explain anything. The author adds a pragmatic criterion: a winning theory must enable production and control of artificial conscious devices.
RUDN Journal of Philosophy December 15, 2022 I. Cherepanov 2 citations
Quantum theories of consciousness, including those by Penrose-Hameroff, Tegmark, Stapp, Fischer, and Mensky, fail to fully explain how complex physical systems generate mental experience without violating the causal closure of the physical world or the epistemological completeness of physics. Quantum mechanics offers processes that may underlie the psyche but does not account for the phenomenal aspect of subjective reality. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle, however, suggests a way consciousness and body could interact without breaking energy conservation. Current quantum theories are largely panprotopsychic, but face a problem because the protomental property must be quantifiable and appear in physical equations. Developing more effective quantum theories requires an emergent approach that explains stepwise transitions across ontological levels—physical, chemical, biological, neurophysiological, and psychic.
RUDN Journal of Philosophy January 9, 2025 Egor V. Falev 1 citation
The paper examines the concept of 'epistemologically different worlds' introduced by Gabriel Vacariu and argues that plagiarism accusations against Marcus Gabriel are unfounded because Gabriel's 'semantic fields' differ from Vacariu's concept, and similar ideas appeared earlier, starting with Jakob Uexküll's 'Umwelt' in 1909. The author traces how Uexküll's Umwelt influenced Husserl's 'lifeworld', Heidegger's 'world-formation', and Varela's 'structural coupling', all of which can be grouped under the notion of epistemologically different worlds. While denying Vacariu priority, the term is deemed productive. A classification of five stages of overcoming representativism is proposed, with Heidegger's interpretation of the phenomenon of world considered logically superior, concluding that 'existence' applies only within the human world, not to animal umwelt.
RUDN Journal of Philosophy January 10, 2023 Anastasiia A. Zhudina 1 citation
Neurophilosophy lacks a universal definition; each researcher defines it individually. Georg Northoff's nonreductive neurophilosophy integrates philosophy of consciousness and neuroscience without reducing consciousness to the brain. He grounds his approach in process ontology and emphasizes the brain-body-environment connection for the emergence of a processual self. Northoff does not seek to solve the hard problem of consciousness but instead questions and dissolves its premises, arguing that philosophers should consider the brain holistically as neuroscientific research does, rather than focusing on isolated brain areas.
RUDN Journal of Philosophy June 30, 2026 Boris Sergeevich Solozhenkin
In twentieth-century pragmatist thought, a conflict emerged between two epistemological orientations: coping with (interaction) and copy (representation). Richard Rorty’s philosophy, along with radical constructivism, embraces coping while rejecting copy as an explanation for cognition. This work argues that completely rejecting copy is unfeasible: Rorty’s model, like any absolutization of the constructive aspect of cognition, contains a hidden form of asserting the real, forming an “exhausted realism.” Drawing on enactivism, the authors describe three ways the “real” impacts constructive activities. Anti-representationalism is practically inadequate, worsened by Rorty’s understanding of practice and language. The article justifies the absolutization of coping through the classic opposition between knowledge-how and knowledge-that, which reflect different tasks and modes of legitimizing knowledge. Coping is structurally linked to copy, just as practice is linked to reality.
RUDN Journal of Philosophy March 31, 2026 Oleg T. Ermishin
Merab Mamardashvili and Alexander Pyatigorsky developed a 'metatheory of consciousness' in their joint work 'Symbol and consciousness' (completed 1974, published 1982), describing the structure of consciousness and seeking a universal synthesizing category. They viewed consciousness as a combination of content and form, a sphere of symbols and interpretations, and called their approach 'symbology,' where different symbol systems arise through understanding. Mamardashvili later focused on consciousness and individual self, moving toward 'real psychology'—concrete consciousness turned to life phenomena—while Pyatigorsky developed 'observational philosophy' combining phenomenology and Buddhist theory, emphasizing an impersonal observation process and the external observer as a structure of consciousness.
RUDN Journal of Philosophy October 2, 2025 André Leclerc
Philosophers across Latin America—particularly in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and Colombia—have made notable contributions to the philosophy of mind, covering topics such as externalism, naturalism, enactivism, extended mind, physicalism, mental causation, intentionality, consciousness, action theory, philosophy of information, ecological psychology, and the philosophy of perception, emotion, and memory. Organized research groups and regular conferences support this work. This paper highlights these contributions, emphasizing their relevance within the analytic philosophical movement in the region.
RUDN Journal of Philosophy July 16, 2025 Anatoly G. Pushkarsky
The artificial intelligence program originally relied on a positivistic, anti-psychological paradigm that modeled thinking with logical machines, but faced technical and conceptual difficulties. Despite successes in deep learning neural networks since the 2000s, connectionism has proven ineffective for representing high-level knowledge and precise symbolic processing—higher cognitive abilities. Some AI specialists and cognitive philosophers have turned to Kant's philosophy of consciousness, which describes a transcendental macroarchitecture of an intellectual system with active cognitive activity. This architecture is derived not from empirical studies but from a priori conditions for the possibility of consciousness, aiming to reveal a structure isomorphic to any rational subject. The study examines what Kant's philosophy offers AI and cognitive science.
RUDN Journal of Philosophy January 9, 2025 Elena V. Kosilova
This paper examines how experience enters into philosophical reasoning, arguing that while philosophical statements claim universal validity, experience—understood narrowly as sensory input or broadly to include the experience of thinking—plays a crucial role. The author explores examples from the philosophy of music, neurophenomenology, psychopathology, and existential philosophy, where metaphysical claims are made on the basis of experiential data. The hypothesis proposed is that metaphysical judgments follow only from other metaphysical judgments, with experience serving as a filter rather than a source. The distinction between experiential truths and normative, extra-experiential truths remains an open question.
RUDN Journal of Philosophy January 9, 2025 Natalia V. Zaitseva, Dmitry V. Zaitsev
Experimental philosophy is not a distinct subfield but a radical methodological shift that synthesizes traditional philosophical analysis with empirical methods from cognitive science. This approach allows philosophers to participate in all research stages, from modeling phenomena to designing experiments and interpreting results, making it applicable across epistemology, ontology, logic, and philosophy of language. The authors highlight (neuro)phenomenology as particularly fruitful because its focus on subjective experience aligns methodologically with natural sciences. The paper introduces a special journal issue and provides an overview of its studies.
RUDN Journal of Philosophy December 15, 2024 Olga A. Vlasova
Psychiatric neurophenomenology, largely neglected in Russian scholarship, bridges early 20th-century philosophical psychiatry with modern neuroscience. The paper traces how key ideas from Karl Jaspers (description and understanding), Erwin Strauss (prelogical experience), Ludwig Binswanger (immediate experience beyond subject-object split), and R.D. Laing (embodiment and communication) reappear in contemporary work by J. Parnas, G. Stanghellini, L. Sass, D. Zahavi, K. Mundt, and T. Fuchs. By focusing on lived experience rather than the biological-psychological dichotomy, neurophenomenology creates a shared research field that resolves the antinomies historically dividing philosophy of psychiatry, opening new perspectives for interdisciplinary practice.
RUDN Journal of Philosophy December 15, 2023 J. Sokolova
Consciousness is a complex, multidimensional phenomenon studied across philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, and other fields. The author argues that because consciousness is an umbrella term with different meanings in different contexts, and because core issues like the hard problem, mind-body problem, explanatory gap, and implications of artificial intelligence remain unresolved, interdisciplinary approaches offer the greatest heuristic potential for advancing understanding. The paper reviews key thinkers from the late 1980s—Baars, Dennett, Penrose, Crick, Koch, Chalmers—who helped establish consciousness as an interdisciplinary research domain.
RUDN Journal of Philosophy October 6, 2021 Hans Martin Dober
The essay argues against reducing human consciousness to algorithms, natural processes, or social constructions, which challenge ethical humanism. It seeks to defend embodied subjectivity, freedom, and the unity of thought, will, and feeling, while reviving the concept of the soul. Drawing on Hermann Cohen's Neo-Kantian philosophy, the first part examines his early interpretation of Plato as the foundation for a systematic psychology Cohen never wrote. It shows how Cohen's Logic, Ethics, and Aesthetics address questions from his early work, with special attention to his philosophy of religion. The self-movement of the soul and its connection to the body are understood through the unity of human culture and the wholeness of man.
RUDN Journal of Philosophy September 16, 2018 P N Baryshnikov
The computational approach to phenomenal consciousness has explanatory limits, especially regarding subjective experience. The article argues that the causal incompatibility in the mind-body problem stems from the experience of using linguistic signs, along with semiotic and narrative features of memory. Cognitive processes aim to reconcile pure experience with conceptual schemes, but computational models capture only one aspect of mental states. Natural language alone links the bodily organization of subjective experience to the narrative additional reality of phenomenal states. The conceptual system underlying subjective reality emerges from continuously comparing the qualitative properties of sensory experience, stored in memory, with the content of communicative practices.