Advances in Consciousness Research
November 29, 2000
46 citations
Investigating phenomenal consciousness requires a precise understanding of its phenomena and general truths about its nature, which can be achieved through first-person, second-person, and third-person methods. This book introduces creative applications of these methods to explore the relationship between consciousness and the brain, examine or change consciousness itself, and understand how social, clinical, and therapeutic contexts influence it. It also provides maps of the consciousness studies field to clarify the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches and demonstrate the interplay between methodology and epistemology, placing diverse methods into an interdisciplinary context.
Advances in Consciousness Research
June 17, 2015
Berit Brogaard
20 citations
A philosophical examination argues that phenomenal consciousness may involve an ontological gap—a fundamental difference from physical reality—without an explanatory gap, meaning science could still explain it. This challenges both the view that science cannot explain consciousness (explanatory gap) and the view that an explanatory gap implies an ontological gap (property dualism). The paper explores this fourth logical possibility, suggesting consciousness might be physically explained yet ontologically distinct.
Advances in Consciousness Research
June 17, 2015
14 citations
The nature of phenomenal consciousness and its relation to brain activity remains debated. This volume brings together scientists and philosophers to discuss whether specific neural activities constitute consciousness or merely correlate with it, examining phenomena such as binocular rivalry, attention, memory, affect, pain, dreams, and coma. It explores the appropriate level of neural activity for constituting consciousness, what the science of consciousness should aim to explain, and whether relations such as identity, supervenience, realization, emergence, or causation better capture the brain-mind connection. Building on earlier work on visual consciousness, this collection addresses empirical and conceptual questions in this interdisciplinary field.
Advances in Consciousness Research
June 17, 2015
Jeroen J.a. Van Boxtel, Naotsugu Tsuchiya
11 citations
A chapter examines confounds that must be controlled when studying the neural basis of phenomenal conscious perception. It reviews psychological and neural studies that dissociate attention, report, and memory from phenomenal consciousness, discussing phenomena such as aftereffects, change blindness, inattentional blindness, and brain-imaging results whose implications for consciousness theory may be contaminated by these factors. The chapter also considers whether report and memory are necessary or sufficient for phenomenal consciousness.
Advances in Consciousness Research
April 12, 2001
Evan Harris Walker
4 citations
Consciousness arises from quantum mechanical processes in the brain, specifically from tunneling and state vector collapse driven by the brain's comparison loops, as described by a modified Schrödinger equation (MSE). This quantum view of consciousness can resolve longstanding problems in neurophysiology and physics, including the conflict between general relativity and quantum theory. The theory also offers a solution to the measurement problem in quantum mechanics and yields testable experimental predictions.
Advances in Consciousness Research
June 17, 2015
Zoe Drayson
3 citations
Consciousness research advances, but the 'phenomenal' aspect—the first-person, subjective feel of experience—remains hard to explain. This aspect appears private and knowable in a special way, clashing with science's objective, third-person methods. The introduction surveys phenomenal consciousness, philosophical arguments about its nature, and whether an explanation for its properties should be expected.
Advances in Consciousness Research
August 7, 2012
Roberto Palaia
3 citations
In 17th- and 18th-century European languages, the word 'consciousness' underwent a semantic shift. Previously tied to theology and ethics, it acquired a new meaning in early modern thought, referring to knowledge of the self. Phrases like 'freedom of consciousness' and 'casus conscientiae' became more frequent in political, religious, scientific, and philosophical texts. This analysis examines these semantic fields in key philosophical and scientific works, focusing on their specific uses and contexts.
Advances in Consciousness Research
June 17, 2015
Jonathan P. Opie, Gerard J. O’brien
2 citations
Philosophers now largely reject reductionism to microphysics in favor of functional explanations for the special sciences, but a closer look at scientific practice shows that the actual explanatory strategy is mechanistic: appealing to active material entities organized to produce target phenomena. The authors argue that phenomenal consciousness will also be explained mechanistically, as the activity of specific neural mechanisms in the brain. This perspective implies that consciousness has a complex structural essence, which the chapter explores.
Advances in Consciousness Research
July 11, 2012
Rick Dale, Deborah P. Tollefsen, Christopher T. Kello
2 citations
Conscious experience and selfhood depend on many mechanisms operating at different levels of space, time, and complexity. These include the global workspace for conscious information, the role of action in self-awareness, and social and narrative influences. The authors argue that phenomenal experience likely relies on all these levels simultaneously. They propose two challenges: investigating the sustained dynamics of phenomenal experience and understanding how multi-scale cognitive processes interact to produce its richness. They do not aim to solve the hard problem of consciousness but contend that any solution must account for this pluralistic nature.
Advances in Consciousness Research
June 17, 2015
Derk Pereboom
A physicalist account of the mind is developed, responding to arguments that conscious experience seems to resist physical explanation. The author first answers the knowledge and conceivability arguments by suggesting introspection might misrepresent phenomenal states as having qualities they lack. An alternative Russellian monist view is then proposed, where unknown intrinsic physical properties ground known microphysical properties and also explain phenomenal consciousness. Finally, a nonreductive physicalism is defended, where the mental is materially constituted by the microphysical rather than identical to it.
Advances in Consciousness Research
August 7, 2012
Monica Riccio
Modern philosophy transformed the concept of sensation from a bodily, surface-level experience into an interior, mental event. The paper argues that sensation, rooted in the passive experience of "being touched," forces a passage from the external body into the inner depths of consciousness, modifying the mind and soul. Focusing on Malebranche and Condillac, it shows how both thinkers, despite differing arguments—Malebranche reworking Cartesian dualism and Condillac following Lockean anti-innatism—recognized the fundamental passivity of the sentient subject. Sensation's pervasive power helped generate a new, expanded representation of the inner space of consciousness, shifting focus from the body's surface to the mind's interior.
Advances in Consciousness Research
April 12, 2001
Philip Van Loocke
A framework is proposed in which systems are shaped by both forces acting from the past and selection procedures acting from the future. Forces determine a set of possible states, and selection, guided by a criterion not reducible to those forces, picks the actual state. This teleological insertion improves performance in cognitive and generative art examples. It is conjectured that, given the universe's complexity, selection can operate systematically without violating physical laws. The relation between selection and the philosophy of consciousness is discussed.