April 2026
Philosophy of mind
What April 2026's 19 new studies found, synthesized from the papers below. All Philosophy of mind research →
The synthesis
Synthesized from 19 studies in the library · AI-generated, grounded in the abstracts below
Found by searching the library for Philosophy of mind, consciousness studies, hard problem, phenomenology, then ranked by relevance.
Research on philosophy of mind in April 2026 focused on phenomenological and enactive accounts of selfhood, consciousness, and perception, with consistent findings that minimal selfhood is grounded in bodily and coenesthetic experience, that consciousness is better understood as intermittent rather than continuous, and that folk conceptions of perception are conflicted between direct and indirect realism. A key caveat is that most studies are theoretical or small-scale empirical, limiting generalizability.
Confidence in the evidence
Low-Moderate- Multiple theoretical and phenomenological studies (e.g., 29615, 29616, 29784, 29924) converge on embodied and enactive views, but most are not empirical.
- Only a few empirical studies (e.g., 32058, 29978) provide quantitative data, with small to moderate sample sizes (n=67, longitudinal).
- One experimental philosophy study (35388) uses validated measures but is limited to self-report and vignettes.
- No large-scale RCTs or meta-analyses directly address philosophy of mind questions; evidence is primarily conceptual and qualitative.
How we rate confidence
Confidence reflects the strength of the underlying evidence, not whether the result is favorable. It weighs the number and size of studies, their design (randomized trials count for more than observational or single-case work), how consistently they point the same way, and their risk of bias.
Tiers run from Insufficient to High. High is rare in this field: small, early, or open-label studies land lower even when their direction is encouraging.
Evidence by study
Direction is each study's finding relative to your question: Supports, Opposes, No effect, Mixed, or Unclear.
| Study | Design | Sample size | Direction | Finding |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The feeling of being alive: phenomenology and biology 2026 | theoretical | Supports | Argues that self-experience is a manifestation of the whole organism's life process, not localized in the brain, and that the feeling of being alive is the fundamental form of self-awareness. | |
| Giving thickness to the minimal self: coenesthetic depth and the materiality of consciousness 2026 | theoretical | Supports | Proposes that minimal selfhood has a 'coenesthetic thickness' grounded in bodily materiality, drawing on Sartre and historical research to explain self-alterations in schizophrenia. | |
| La conciencia no fluye: pulsa Sobre el mito de la continuidad 2026 | theoretical | Supports | Challenges the metaphor of consciousness as a continuous flow, arguing instead that it is an intermittent, pulsed phenomenon based on neuroscience and philosophy. | |
| Living the Five Domains: Phenomenal Co-Presence, Cognitive Embeddedness, and the Limits of Description 2026 | theoretical | Supports | Develops a framework where five domains of experience are co-present and cognitively grounded, using enactivism and predictive processing to argue for their real structure. | |
| A 20-Year Descriptive Phenomenological Study of Depersonalization and Derealization as an Alteration in Sense of Self and Lifeworld. 2026 | observational | Supports | Found that depersonalization and derealization are transdiagnostic but more prevalent in schizophrenia, with self-disturbance as a foundational construct in schizophrenia but not affective psychosis. | |
| Bare Awareness and Procedural Insight: A Naturalized Account of Minimal -Dual Experience 2026 | theoretical | Supports | Argues that 'bare awareness' or minimal-dual experiences are procedural knowledge accessible through trained practices, not metaphysical revelations, and can be integrated with neuroscience. | |
| The Hard Problem of Intentionality for Radical Enactive Cognition 2026 | theoretical | Opposes | Critiques Radical Enactive Cognition's account of intentionality, arguing that teleosemiotics fails to ground content-free intentionality and collapses into stimulus-response behaviorism. | |
| Poor insight and self-disorders in schizophrenia: an empirical study. 2026 | observational | 67 | Supports | Found that self-disorders are associated with impaired insight in schizophrenia independently of other symptoms and intelligence, supporting a phenomenological model. |
| The Illusion of Presence: ontological limits of algorithmic mediation in contemporary subjectivity 2026 | theoretical | Opposes | Argues that algorithmic mediation produces an 'illusion of presence' that empties shared vulnerability, with implications for philosophy of mind and contemporary suffering. | |
| Art and linguistic bodies: a transformative view 2026 | theoretical | Supports | Proposes a transformative view of art as symbolic transformation within the enactive framework of 'linguistic bodies,' drawing on Gadamer and enactivist perspectives. | |
| Decoding the phenomenology of spontaneous thought using large language-model ratings on verbal retrospective free reports 2026 | observational | 22 | Supports | Demonstrated that LLMs can reliably rate phenomenological dimensions of spontaneous thoughts from verbal reports, and that emotional valence can be decoded from EEG. |
| Can Self-Disorders Be Self-Rated? Theoretical and Empirical Validity of the Inventory of Psychotic-Like Anomalous Self-Experiences. 2026 | observational | 41 | Mixed | Found moderate correlation between self-report (IPASE) and interview (EASE) measures of self-disorders, but limited overlap, suggesting self-report may capture ordinary or psychotic experiences rather than subtle self-disorders. |
| Direct or indirect realism? Assessing conflicting folk conceptions of vision 2026 | observational | Mixed | Found that laypeople hold conflicting direct and indirect realist beliefs about vision, suggesting folk conceptions are torn between both views. | |
| Awakening as Neurophenomenology: An Empirical Case Study Based on EEG 2026 | case study | 1 | Supports | EEG data from a subject in an 'awakening' state showed increased fast-wave activity and alpha suppression, distinguishing it from drug-induced sedation. |
| Calculation and Collapse: How Parametric Introspection Enables Minimal-Dual Breakthrough 2026 | theoretical | Supports | Proposes a parametric introspection model (I × F × D ≥ T) for achieving minimal-dual consciousness, integrating phenomenology, analytic philosophy, and contemplative science. | |
| The Phenomenology of Ma‘rifat al-Hallaj: Interpreting Anā al-Ḥaqq Amidst the Spiritual Crisis of the Contemporary Era 2026 | theoretical | Supports | Interprets al-Hallaj's 'Anā al-Ḥaqq' as a phenomenological testimony to ego dissolution and transcendence of subject-object duality, relevant to contemporary spiritual crisis. | |
| A Systematic Review of Clinical Phenomenology, Differential Diagnosis and Prognostic Outcomes of Substance-Induced Psychotic Disorders. 2026 | review | 80000 | Unclear | Systematic review found substance-specific phenomenological signatures but substantial overlap with primary psychotic disorders and poor diagnostic stability. |
| Brain Codex Editorial Catalogue 2025–2026 2026 | theoretical | Unclear | Editorial catalogue listing publications at the intersection of neuroscience, philosophy, and related fields; no specific findings reported. | |
| Mapping of Subjective Accounts into Interpreted Clusters (MOSAIC): Topic Modelling and LLM applied to Stroboscopic Phenomenology. 2026 | theoretical | Unclear | Title only; no abstract provided, so no finding can be extracted. |
Argues that self-experience is a manifestation of the whole organism's life process, not localized in the brain, and that the feeling of being alive is the fundamental form of self-awareness.
theoretical
Proposes that minimal selfhood has a 'coenesthetic thickness' grounded in bodily materiality, drawing on Sartre and historical research to explain self-alterations in schizophrenia.
theoretical
Challenges the metaphor of consciousness as a continuous flow, arguing instead that it is an intermittent, pulsed phenomenon based on neuroscience and philosophy.
theoretical
Develops a framework where five domains of experience are co-present and cognitively grounded, using enactivism and predictive processing to argue for their real structure.
theoretical
Found that depersonalization and derealization are transdiagnostic but more prevalent in schizophrenia, with self-disturbance as a foundational construct in schizophrenia but not affective psychosis.
observational
Argues that 'bare awareness' or minimal-dual experiences are procedural knowledge accessible through trained practices, not metaphysical revelations, and can be integrated with neuroscience.
theoretical
Critiques Radical Enactive Cognition's account of intentionality, arguing that teleosemiotics fails to ground content-free intentionality and collapses into stimulus-response behaviorism.
theoretical
Found that self-disorders are associated with impaired insight in schizophrenia independently of other symptoms and intelligence, supporting a phenomenological model.
observational Sample size: 67
Argues that algorithmic mediation produces an 'illusion of presence' that empties shared vulnerability, with implications for philosophy of mind and contemporary suffering.
theoretical
Proposes a transformative view of art as symbolic transformation within the enactive framework of 'linguistic bodies,' drawing on Gadamer and enactivist perspectives.
theoretical
Demonstrated that LLMs can reliably rate phenomenological dimensions of spontaneous thoughts from verbal reports, and that emotional valence can be decoded from EEG.
observational Sample size: 22
Found moderate correlation between self-report (IPASE) and interview (EASE) measures of self-disorders, but limited overlap, suggesting self-report may capture ordinary or psychotic experiences rather than subtle self-disorders.
observational Sample size: 41
Found that laypeople hold conflicting direct and indirect realist beliefs about vision, suggesting folk conceptions are torn between both views.
observational
EEG data from a subject in an 'awakening' state showed increased fast-wave activity and alpha suppression, distinguishing it from drug-induced sedation.
case study Sample size: 1
Proposes a parametric introspection model (I × F × D ≥ T) for achieving minimal-dual consciousness, integrating phenomenology, analytic philosophy, and contemplative science.
theoretical
Interprets al-Hallaj's 'Anā al-Ḥaqq' as a phenomenological testimony to ego dissolution and transcendence of subject-object duality, relevant to contemporary spiritual crisis.
theoretical
Systematic review found substance-specific phenomenological signatures but substantial overlap with primary psychotic disorders and poor diagnostic stability.
review Sample size: 80000
Editorial catalogue listing publications at the intersection of neuroscience, philosophy, and related fields; no specific findings reported.
theoretical
Title only; no abstract provided, so no finding can be extracted.
theoretical
Points of agreement
- Multiple studies converge on the idea that minimal selfhood is grounded in bodily and coenesthetic experience, not in a brain-bound model (29615, 29616, 29978).
- Several theoretical works support an enactive or embodied approach to consciousness and perception (29924, 33572, 30834).
- There is agreement that consciousness may be intermittent rather than continuous (29784) and that self-disorders are central to schizophrenia (29978, 32058).
Conflicts
- One study (35388) finds laypeople hold conflicting direct and indirect realist beliefs about vision, while philosophical debates assume a single common-sense view.
- The validity of self-report measures for self-disorders is contested: one study (34923) shows limited overlap with interview measures, while another (33798) supports LLM-based ratings for spontaneous thought.
- Radical Enactive Cognition's account of intentionality is challenged (31884), conflicting with enactive frameworks that reject representation.
Gaps
- Most studies are theoretical or small-scale; large empirical studies testing phenomenological models are lacking.
- Durability and generalizability of findings on self-disorders and insight (32058, 29978) across diverse populations are not established.
- The parametric model for minimal-dual consciousness (29785) lacks empirical validation.
- The role of algorithmic mediation in subjectivity (33451) is discussed theoretically but not empirically tested.
- No studies directly compare different philosophical accounts of perception or consciousness using experimental methods beyond self-report.