Review of Philosophy and Psychology
April 1, 2021
Daniel S Shabasson
20 citations
Illusionism holds that phenomenal consciousness—the subjective, qualitative feel of experience—is an introspective illusion. This paper proposes a theory to explain why we are strongly disposed to mistakenly judge that we are phenomenally conscious. The explanation rests on three hypotheses: introspective opacity (we have limited access to our own mental processes), the infallibility intuition (we assume our introspective judgments are correct), and the justification constraint (we seek reasons for our judgments). These lead us to draw erroneous unconscious inferences about our sensory states, creating the illusion of phenomenal consciousness. The theory also accounts for common intuitions about consciousness—that it involves ineffable, private, non-physical qualities—and addresses why illusionism itself seems counterintuitive.
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
December 22, 2021
Maja Spener
15 citations
The paper argues that current philosophers of perception rely on introspection in two distinct ways—introspective access and introspective method—without clearly distinguishing them. Concerns raised over a century ago by Introspectionist Psychologists about using introspection to gather data on consciousness apply to these contemporary philosophical uses but remain unacknowledged. Applying this distinction reveals that arguments based on introspective phenomenal descriptions are methodologically flawed. The critique does not reject introspection entirely but calls for more careful application in philosophical theorizing.
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
October 10, 2023
Paweł Gładziejewski
11 citations
Psychedelic substances can produce powerful, strange conscious experiences that often change people's metaphysical beliefs about reality, including beliefs that seem bizarre from a naturalistic perspective. This paper argues that such altered states can be rationally integrated into a person's epistemic life, meaning that updating metaphysical beliefs based on these experiences does not necessarily involve epistemic irrationality.
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
March 28, 2026
Mcarthur Mingon, Alexander James Gillett, John Sutton
Negative assessments of GPS as causing 'de-skilling' and disrupting spatial memory are widespread, but a broader perspective shows human spatial memory has always been incomplete and dependent on culture, social practices, and environment. GPS effects are better understood as reconfigurations of wayfinding ecologies—distributed cognitive systems used for navigation. Negative effects are not inevitable but emerge from longer historical processes of cognitive-technological coevolution. Individual and group variability in spatial cognition and technology use matters: some users become passive, while others develop expert strategies of skillful incorporation. The key is not whether GPS is used, but how, and opportunities exist for deliberate ecological design to shape future wayfinding ecologies.
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
March 3, 2026
Mads J. Dengsø
Human temporality and temporal cognition have always been hybrid structures that combine biological and sociotechnological components. Contrary to common assumptions that modern sociotechnology causes temporal disruption through integration, disruptions actually result from the disintegration of these biological and sociotechnological components. Drawing on neuroanthropology and neuroscience of temporal cognition, the paper argues that human temporal capacities like memory and sense of time have always been partly sociotechnological. Reviewing sociological research on technology and time, recognizing this hybrid structure provides theoretical resources for identifying and addressing temporal disruption.
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
March 1, 2026
Francesca Righetti, Bastien Perroy
Temporal disorientation in episodic memory involves recalling events that are difficult to place in time. This paper argues for a constrained functional analogy between mental time travel and spatial navigation, characterizing temporal orientation as coordination between egocentric anchors and temporal structure (order, interval, and calendrical constraints). Temporal disorientation arises when this coordination breaks down. Drawing on constructive accounts of episodic memory, specifically the Scenario Construction Framework, the authors identify two distinct experiences: uncertainty whether an event occurred, and difficulty constructing the temporal sequence of remembered content. They propose that navigation in mental time and the feeling of temporal disorientation scaffold episodic construction, opening new paths for investigating mental navigation's role in memory.
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
November 11, 2025
Gabriel Siegel
The sense of agency—the experience of predicting, initiating, or controlling actions—appears in perceptual consciousness. This paper proposes a novel account: the perceptual sense of agency (PSoA) is underpinned by self-monitoring processes that compare sensory predictions based on motor commands with actual sensory feedback, distinguishing self-caused from other-caused perceptual changes. The PSoA is not explained by specific contents represented in perceptual experience; instead, it is modeled as a type of intentional mode that perceivers bear to contents. The account is defended against objections and contrasted with alternative views.
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
February 3, 2025
Victor Lange
Mindfulness research spans philosophy, psychology, psychiatry, neuroscience, and Buddhist studies, yet it remains unclear what psychological capacity is essential to mindfulness and sets it apart from other mental activities. The leading idea—that mindfulness is a special form of metacognitive control—is examined and found inadequate in current formulations. A novel account is proposed, based on metacognitive goals, which explains the explicit self-awareness and self-regulation in mindfulness and distinguishes it from ordinary cognitive control. On this account, metacognitive control is necessary but not sufficient for mindfulness. The account further suggests that the metacognitive control of mindfulness can be reduced to other psychological capacities and that this control is a form of mental action.
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
November 22, 2022
Daniel Wehinger
The paper critically examines the transcendental argument for universal mineness, which claims that phenomenal consciousness essentially involves self-consciousness in the sense of mineness—that every experience is given as mine. The author discusses the argument's potential but highlights its limitations, showing that even if successful, it cannot establish an essential connection between phenomenal consciousness and self-consciousness. Because the transcendental argument is considered the central support for universal mineness, its failure leaves the claim insufficiently substantiated, calling into question the idea that all experiences are necessarily given as mine.