January 2026
Philosophy of mind
What January 2026's 25 new studies found, synthesized from the papers below. All Philosophy of mind research →
The synthesis
Synthesized from 25 studies in the library · AI-generated, grounded in the abstracts below
Found by searching the library for Philosophy of mind, consciousness studies, hard problem, phenomenology, then ranked by relevance.
Research on philosophy of mind in January 2026 is highly diverse and largely theoretical, with no single empirical conclusion. The literature spans metaphysical debates (e.g., enactivism, trivialism about the explanatory gap), phenomenological methods (e.g., microphenomenology, neurophenomenology), and conceptual analyses of consciousness, self, and psychosis. The evidence is almost entirely non-empirical, consisting of philosophical arguments, theoretical frameworks, and reviews, with a few empirical studies on related phenomena (e.g., near-death experiences, felt presence, thought dynamics) that do not directly test philosophical claims.
Confidence in the evidence
Insufficient- The vast majority of studies are theoretical, philosophical, or review articles, not empirical tests of specific hypotheses.
- Only a few empirical studies are present (e.g., NDE scale validation, felt presence survey, thought dynamics experiments), and they address peripheral phenomena, not core philosophy-of-mind questions.
- No studies directly test or resolve the central philosophical debates (e.g., hard problem, panpsychism, dualism) with empirical data.
- The sample sizes in empirical studies are moderate (e.g., 705, 376, 1951), but they are not designed to answer the overarching research question.
How we rate confidence
Confidence reflects the strength of the underlying evidence, not whether the result is favorable. It weighs the number and size of studies, their design (randomized trials count for more than observational or single-case work), how consistently they point the same way, and their risk of bias.
Tiers run from Insufficient to High. High is rare in this field: small, early, or open-label studies land lower even when their direction is encouraging.
Evidence by study
Direction is each study's finding relative to your question: Supports, Opposes, No effect, Mixed, or Unclear.
| Study | Design | Sample size | Direction | Finding |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| From function to freedom: enactivism between being and becoming 2026 | theoretical | Unclear | Argues that the turn to affirmationist ontologies in enactivism is metaphysically incompatible with its foundational commitments, and proposes a Jonas-inspired alternative. | |
| Trivialisms about Explanatory Gap 2026 | theoretical | Unclear | Defends trivialist views that the phenomenal explanatory gap may not be as special as commonly assumed. | |
| Operationalizing near‑death experiences: Stability of the NDE Rasch hierarchy over two decades. 2026 | observational | 705 | Supports | Confirmed that the NDE Scale and NDE-C measure the same construct, with the original NDE Scale recommended for its psychometric robustness and historical comparability. |
| The Blessing of Memory Loss: Toward a Sacred Phenomenology of Forgetting 2026 | theoretical | Unclear | Proposes a phenomenological and theological reframing of memory loss as sacred release rather than solely neurological decline. | |
| Material Phenomenology 2026 | theoretical | Unclear | Interview with Michel Henry discussing his phenomenology of life, body, and his works on Marx and Christianity. | |
| Beyond the Hard Problem: Integrating Philosophy, Neuroscience, and AI in Consciousness Research 2026 | review | Unclear | Synthesizes philosophical debates (qualia, hard problem, panpsychism) with neuroscientific theories (GWT, IIT) and explores machine consciousness. | |
| Expanding Microphenomenology: The Researcher-as-Obstacle Approach to Continuous Phenomena 2026 | theoretical | Unclear | Introduces the Researcher-as-Obstacle framework for micro-phenomenological investigation of continuous phenomena, illustrated with a case study of a professional artist. | |
| Building science and subjectivity from flesh. Towards a reconceptualization of neurophenomenology as a contribution to interdisciplinary health research 2026 | theoretical | Unclear | Argues that Merleau-Ponty's notion of 'flesh' provides a viable framework for constitution in radical neurophenomenology, with implications for neuroimaging and qualitative analysis. | |
| Dreaming and mind wandering: Spontaneous thought across the sleep-wake cycle. Editorial introduction 2026 | theoretical | Unclear | Editorial introduction to a special issue linking dreaming and mind wandering as spontaneous thought across the sleep-wake cycle. | |
| Scientific Method, Complexity and Phenomenology in Human Knowledge 2026 | theoretical | Unclear | Argues for integrating complexity-based experimental studies with phenomenology, developing Varela's neurophenomenology into a 'third person studying a double first person' model. | |
| Felt Presence and Psychosis Risk in the General Population. 2026 | observational | 376 | Supports | Felt presence and anxiety significantly predicted elevated psychosis risk; distress during felt presence was a key predictor over covariates. |
| Phenomenology of Hallucinations in Endogenous and Substance-Related Exogenous Psychoses. 2026 | theoretical | Unclear | Uses ideal-typical and phenomenological methods to qualitatively distinguish hallucinations in schizophrenia from those in substance-induced and persistent psychoses. | |
| A Phenomenology of Recognition in Psychosocial Interventions for Psychosis 2026 | theoretical | Unclear | Applies a phenomenological perspective on recognition to psychosocial interventions for psychosis, emphasizing mutual and relational recognition. | |
| Making sense of "senseless actions" in relation to criminal insanity. 2026 | theoretical | Unclear | Revisits the concept of 'senseless actions' in schizophrenia, arguing for its forensic relevance as a behavioral indicator of psychosis. | |
| Theoretical Perspectives on the Minimal and Narrative Self in the Schizophrenia Spectrum: An Integrative Review. 2026 | review | Unclear | Integrative review of theoretical models linking minimal and narrative self-disturbances in schizophrenia, finding the literature preliminary and speculative. | |
| Computational spirits: a neuroscientific account of psychedelic entity encounters. 2026 | theoretical | Unclear | Proposes a neurocomputational model (active inference) for psychedelic entity encounters, suggesting reduced sensory predictability biases the brain toward non-self agentic sources. | |
| Conscious simultaneity with continuous motion: a measure-theoretic resolution of the hard problem. 2026 | theoretical | Unclear | Argues that the hard problem of consciousness arises from a measure-theoretic limit analogous to quantum-classical incompatibility, and proposes consciousness as an ontological workaround. | |
| Consciousness Between Fact and Value: A Triadic Neurophenomenology 2026 | theoretical | Unclear | Introduces a triadic neurophenomenological framework integrating neuroscience, phenomenology, and axiology, with testable hypotheses for distinct neural signatures. | |
| Teoria da Consciência Relacional (TCR v3.2): Gesto da Carne, Limiar de Qualia e Dissolução do Hard Problem 2026 | theoretical | Unclear | Proposes a non-dualist Relational Consciousness Theory that dissolves the hard problem, with a formalized threshold for qualia (C = G × I × T × R) and rejection of panpsychism. | |
| Illuminating consciousness. 2026 | review | Unclear | Reviews historical and contemporary perspectives on consciousness across philosophy, science, and practice, aiming to synthesize a holistic framework. | |
| Phenomenology of the stream of thought: dissociable dynamic dimensions revealed through experience sampling. 2026 | observational | Supports | Found that freely moving and deliberately directed thought dynamics are distinguishable, negatively correlated, and introspectively accessible across contexts. | |
| The nature of mind scale (NOMS): Validation of an eight-dimensional scale assessing beliefs about the relationship between mind and matter. 2026 | observational | 1074 | Supports | Validated the Nature of Mind Scale (NOMS) with an eight-factor structure capturing diverse philosophical positions on mind-body relations, with strongest endorsement of interactionism. |
| Artificial Consciousness as Interface Representation 2026 | theoretical | Unclear | Proposes SLP-tests (subjective-linguistic, latent-emergent, phenomenological-structural) to reframe artificial consciousness as interface representation using category theory. | |
| Mutually Beneficial Artificial Consciousness 2026 | theoretical | Unclear | Outlines a research agenda for mutually beneficial artificial consciousness, focusing on cultivating beneficial states of consciousness (e.g., compassion) in AI. | |
| Comparing the characteristics of hallucinations and mental imagery: a large cross-sectional study in the general population. 2026 | observational | 1951 | Mixed | Found that involuntary mental imagery is more frequent, vivid, and positive than hallucinations, but moderate to strong correlations support a shared experiential continuum. |
Argues that the turn to affirmationist ontologies in enactivism is metaphysically incompatible with its foundational commitments, and proposes a Jonas-inspired alternative.
theoretical
Defends trivialist views that the phenomenal explanatory gap may not be as special as commonly assumed.
theoretical
Confirmed that the NDE Scale and NDE-C measure the same construct, with the original NDE Scale recommended for its psychometric robustness and historical comparability.
observational Sample size: 705
Proposes a phenomenological and theological reframing of memory loss as sacred release rather than solely neurological decline.
theoretical
Interview with Michel Henry discussing his phenomenology of life, body, and his works on Marx and Christianity.
theoretical
Synthesizes philosophical debates (qualia, hard problem, panpsychism) with neuroscientific theories (GWT, IIT) and explores machine consciousness.
review
Introduces the Researcher-as-Obstacle framework for micro-phenomenological investigation of continuous phenomena, illustrated with a case study of a professional artist.
theoretical
Argues that Merleau-Ponty's notion of 'flesh' provides a viable framework for constitution in radical neurophenomenology, with implications for neuroimaging and qualitative analysis.
theoretical
Editorial introduction to a special issue linking dreaming and mind wandering as spontaneous thought across the sleep-wake cycle.
theoretical
Argues for integrating complexity-based experimental studies with phenomenology, developing Varela's neurophenomenology into a 'third person studying a double first person' model.
theoretical
Felt presence and anxiety significantly predicted elevated psychosis risk; distress during felt presence was a key predictor over covariates.
observational Sample size: 376
Uses ideal-typical and phenomenological methods to qualitatively distinguish hallucinations in schizophrenia from those in substance-induced and persistent psychoses.
theoretical
Applies a phenomenological perspective on recognition to psychosocial interventions for psychosis, emphasizing mutual and relational recognition.
theoretical
Revisits the concept of 'senseless actions' in schizophrenia, arguing for its forensic relevance as a behavioral indicator of psychosis.
theoretical
Integrative review of theoretical models linking minimal and narrative self-disturbances in schizophrenia, finding the literature preliminary and speculative.
review
Proposes a neurocomputational model (active inference) for psychedelic entity encounters, suggesting reduced sensory predictability biases the brain toward non-self agentic sources.
theoretical
Argues that the hard problem of consciousness arises from a measure-theoretic limit analogous to quantum-classical incompatibility, and proposes consciousness as an ontological workaround.
theoretical
Introduces a triadic neurophenomenological framework integrating neuroscience, phenomenology, and axiology, with testable hypotheses for distinct neural signatures.
theoretical
Proposes a non-dualist Relational Consciousness Theory that dissolves the hard problem, with a formalized threshold for qualia (C = G × I × T × R) and rejection of panpsychism.
theoretical
Reviews historical and contemporary perspectives on consciousness across philosophy, science, and practice, aiming to synthesize a holistic framework.
review
Found that freely moving and deliberately directed thought dynamics are distinguishable, negatively correlated, and introspectively accessible across contexts.
observational
Validated the Nature of Mind Scale (NOMS) with an eight-factor structure capturing diverse philosophical positions on mind-body relations, with strongest endorsement of interactionism.
observational Sample size: 1074
Proposes SLP-tests (subjective-linguistic, latent-emergent, phenomenological-structural) to reframe artificial consciousness as interface representation using category theory.
theoretical
Outlines a research agenda for mutually beneficial artificial consciousness, focusing on cultivating beneficial states of consciousness (e.g., compassion) in AI.
theoretical
Found that involuntary mental imagery is more frequent, vivid, and positive than hallucinations, but moderate to strong correlations support a shared experiential continuum.
observational Sample size: 1951
Points of agreement
- Several theoretical papers engage with the hard problem of consciousness, proposing novel frameworks (e.g., triadic neurophenomenology, relational consciousness theory, measure-theoretic resolution).
- Multiple studies emphasize the importance of phenomenological methods (micro-phenomenology, neurophenomenology) for studying subjective experience.
- Several papers address the self and its disturbances in psychosis, linking minimal and narrative self levels.
- A few empirical studies validate scales or explore experiential continua (e.g., NDE, hallucinations vs. mental imagery, thought dynamics).
Conflicts
- Theoretical papers disagree on the metaphysical foundations of enactivism (affirmationist vs. dialectical materialist).
- There is no consensus on whether the hard problem is genuine or can be dissolved (trivialism vs. traditional anti-physicalism).
- Views on panpsychism and machine consciousness are divided: some papers reject panpsychism and deny qualia to AI (e.g., relational consciousness theory), while others explore the possibility of artificial consciousness.
Gaps
- Almost no empirical testing of the core philosophical claims (e.g., hard problem, panpsychism, dualism) is present.
- Durability and long-term effects of proposed frameworks are not studied.
- Blinding, control groups, and replication are absent from the theoretical and review articles.
- Populations studied are limited to general population or specific clinical groups (e.g., near-death experiencers, psychosis risk); no cross-cultural or developmental samples.
- Dose-response or parametric manipulation of philosophical constructs is not addressed.