Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
January 24, 2026
Marius Werz
Enactivism, a theory of mind and life, is undergoing a metaphysical shift as some theorists adopt the 'affirmationist' ontologies of Gilbert Simondon and Gilles Deleuze, which view becoming as a non-teleological process where identities emerge from pre-individual fields. The author argues that this turn is incompatible with enactivism's foundational commitment to self-organizing organismic totalities. Instead, the paper develops a metaphysical framework that preserves these commitments while rejecting functionalist assumptions. It aligns enactivism with Marxist dialectical materialism and reinterprets Hans Jonas's account of life, which grounds meaning and purpose in the dynamic structure of living form rather than instrumental functions, offering a renewed foundation for theorizing purposiveness, autonomy, and change.
Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy
January 19, 2026
Cong Chen
The paper argues that the explanatory gap between physical facts and phenomenal consciousness may be less special than philosophers often assume. It first examines Schaffer's modest Trivialism, which combines the idea that explanatory gaps are common with the claim that the phenomenal gap is not uniquely special, and responds to a critique of that view. It then develops a more radical Trivialism, contending that epistemic insensitivity gives fewer reasons to posit a phenomenal gap compared to other gaps, such as mereological ones. The paper also addresses objections from metaontological deflationism and the possibility of a priori metaphysical knowledge.
Consciousness and cognition
January 18, 2026
Marieta Pehlivanova, Rense Lange, Bruce Greyson et al.
Two scales measuring the phenomenology of near-death experiences—the 16-item NDE Scale and the 20-item NDE-C—were compared in 705 self-identified experiencers. The scales correlate nearly perfectly (r = 0.98), indicating they measure the same underlying construct. However, Rasch analysis revealed problems with the NDE-C's category structure and five novel items. The original NDE Scale's item hierarchy replicated across samples, showing long-term stability. Based on parsimony and psychometric evidence, the original NDE Scale with Rasch scoring and a validated cut-off of 7 (out of 32) is recommended for future research.
New Advances in Brain & Critical Care
January 16, 2026
Julian Ungar-Sargon
Forgetting may be not only neurological decline but a form of sacred release, akin to the Kabbalistic principle of tzimtzum—divine contraction that creates space for new being. Drawing on fifty years of clinical neurology, Jewish mystical theology, phenomenological philosophy, and contemporary neuroscience, the article argues that the medicalization of memory loss has obscured spiritually significant dimensions of human experience. It proposes a framework in which the patient experiencing memory loss is approached not as a failing system requiring repair but as a sacred text requiring interpretation, with implications for clinical practice.
Quiet Powers of the Possible
January 13, 2026
Michel Henry
In an interview compiled by Jean Leclecq and Grégori Jean, Michel Henry discusses his education, his place in the history of phenomenology, his phenomenology of life and the body, and his books on Marx and the philosophy of Christianity.
International Journal of Science and Research (IJSR)
January 10, 2026
Mumun Das.
Consciousness research is advanced by integrating philosophical debates about qualia, the hard problem, panpsychism, and illusionism with empirical neuroscientific theories like Global Workspace Theory and Integrated Information Theory. Interdisciplinary approaches have improved theoretical clarity and empirical testability. The article also examines whether artificial systems could achieve conscious states, offering novel perspectives that bridge diverse frameworks to further the study of consciousness.
January 8, 2026
Raphaël Julliard, Damien Roy, Marion Botella
preprint
Standard micro-phenomenology, which reconstructs short, bounded episodes after they end, struggles to investigate phenomena that practitioners experience as continuous. The Researcher-as-Obstacle (RAO) framework adapts the method by introducing precisely timed interruptions during a pretext experience that mobilizes the continuous process. A case study with a professional artist compared a standard retrospective interview to an RAO session. Standard micro-phenomenology captured fine-grained experiential content but could not temporally anchor the regulative dynamic of the “creative engine.” RAO sacrificed exhaustive diachrony to obtain multiple anchored samples of recurrent patterns, such as the search for a “feeling of life.” RAO extends micro-phenomenology to continuous phenomena while preserving evocation and pre-reflective access.
Medicine Health Care and Philosophy
January 6, 2026
Harald A. Wiltsche, Kristin Zeiler
Radical neurophenomenology rethinks the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity by using the concept of constitution to avoid dualistic frameworks. This paper argues that Merleau-Ponty's later work, especially his notion of the flesh, provides a suitable framework for elaborating a viable concept of co-constitution. Beyond theoretical analysis, the paper illustrates the pragmatic gain of this concept by showing how it should inform the understanding of modern neuroimaging techniques and qualitative phenomenological philosophy analysis of subjectivity and lived experience, thereby contributing to neurophenomenological inquiries.
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
January 5, 2026
Jennifer Windt, Manuela Kirberg, Tomas Andrillon
This special issue brings together theoretical and empirical work on dreaming and waking mind wandering, two areas with growing attention in cognitive neuroscience and psychology but limited philosophical exploration. Despite being studied separately, phenomenological and neurophysiological overlaps between waking mind wandering and sleep-related experiences indicate they are closely linked. These connections prompt questions about the nature and functions of spontaneous mental phenomena, their relationship to wakefulness and sleep, and implications for theories of attention, action, and consciousness.
Systems Research and Behavioral Science
January 4, 2026
Felix Lebed
The classical scientific method, with its deterministic approach, falls short of capturing human complexity. While 20th-century philosophers critiqued this method, their arguments remained philosophical. A critique grounded in empirical science is needed, and the complexity paradigm, emphasizing autopoiesis—manifested through will, moral choices, and intrinsic motivation—offers the most appropriate perspective. Integrating complexity-based experimental studies with phenomenology provides an adequate framework for understanding human beings. Drawing on Varela's neurophenomenology concept of 'third person', the author develops a new epistemological model: 'a third person, studying a double first person'.
Consciousness and cognition
January 1, 2026
Matthias Forstmann, Pascal Burgmer
A new 24-item questionnaire, the Nature of Mind Scale (NOMS), reliably measures eight distinct philosophical views about the relationship between mind and body, including substance dualism, interactionism, panpsychism, idealism, reductive and non-reductive physicalism, mystical monism, and neutral monism. Across four studies with 1,074 participants, exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses confirmed the eight-factor structure. Participants most strongly endorsed interactionism, non-reductive physicalism, and mystical monism, and least supported idealism. The scale showed good model fit, measurement invariance, and convergent validity with existing measures. Construct validity was supported by expected links with religiosity, free will beliefs, cognitive style, personality, and afterlife beliefs.
Frontiers in human neuroscience
January 1, 2026
John Sanfey
The hard problem of consciousness—explaining how subjective experience arises from physical processes—stems from the same logical paradox that makes quantum and classical physics incompatible: the measure-theoretic limit. Continuous time requires point-equivalent instants of zero duration, which cannot exist ontologically, making it impossible to explain state transitions within continuous time without approximations. Consciousness functions as an ontological workaround for problems related to temporally extended information in continuous time, including sensory qualia.
Artificial General Intelligence
January 1, 2026
Robert Prentner
A framework called SLP-tests offers three criteria—subjective-linguistic, latent-emergent, and phenomenological-structural—to assess whether an AI system's interface representations enable consciousness-like properties. Using category theory, interface representations are modeled as mappings between relational substrates and observable behaviors. The approach reframes subjective experience not as an intrinsic property of physical systems but as a functional interface to a relational entity, making the question of artificial consciousness empirically testable.
Artificial General Intelligence
January 1, 2026
Oisín Hugh Clancy
A research agenda for mutually beneficial artificial consciousness (MBAC) proposes engineering AI whose own subjective experience is positive and whose behavior enhances human and non-human flourishing. The agenda centers on beneficial states of consciousness (BSC)—qualitatively valued mind states like kindness, joy, clarity, and non-duality—grouped into affective and contemplative categories. A case study of compassion abstracts five interacting layers (neural, autonomic, hormonal, developmental, trainable) revealing a hierarchical control motif (detect, appraise, switch mode, broadcast, recalibrate) that can inform AI design. The proposed research program has four looping components: cultivating BSC in humans, collecting high-resolution neural, somatic, and cardio-phenomenological data, modeling multiscale dynamics, and translating findings into AI architectures.
Wiley interdisciplinary reviews. Cognitive science
January 1, 2026
Florestan Delcourt, Henry R Cowan, Jordan Sibéoni et al.
Disturbances of the self in schizophrenia are often described at two levels: a pre-reflective, minimal sense of self and a reflective, narrative self. This integrative review examines how these two levels may be linked. Three theoretical models are presented: the Structural model, which suggests minimal self-disorders hierarchically cause narrative disturbances and the schizophrenia phenotype; the Dialectical model, which emphasizes reciprocal interactions between the two levels with both pathogenic and salutogenic effects; and the Contextual model, which considers social, territorial, and biological dimensions. Empirical studies directly testing these links are scarce and preliminary. The literature suggests promising directions for future research and clinical applications.
Consciousness and cognition
January 1, 2026
Guillaume Pepin, Hélène Lœvenbruck, Alan Chauvin et al.
Hallucinations and involuntary mental imagery share many features but differ in key ways. In a survey of 1,951 French-speaking adults, involuntary mental imagery occurred more often than hallucinations and was rated as more vivid, emotionally positive, and self-generated. Hallucinations, by contrast, caused greater distress and were perceived as coming from outside the self. Moderate to strong correlations between the two on most dimensions support the idea of a shared experiential continuum, though differences in agency and controllability challenge existing cognitive models of self-monitoring. Refining these distinctions may improve early detection and prevention of distressing internal experiences.
Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology
January 1, 2026
Lukas Iwer-Docter
Recognition, a concept from political philosophy, is applied to mental health care for psychosis. The paper argues that psychosocial interventions should embody a normative stance that acknowledges patients' subjective experiences and fosters mutual, relational recognition between clinician and patient. Drawing on the work of Honneth and Benjamin, recognition is described as an attitude and reciprocal relationship involving intercorporeal and verbal aspects that build trust. A phenomenological understanding of psychosis highlights alterations in self, world, and other. The analysis shows that such a recognizing stance has therapeutic and social potential, emphasizing the importance of the therapeutic relationship in these interventions.
Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2026
Jonas Mago, George Deane, Lars Sandved-Smith et al.
People under the influence of psychedelics often report encountering autonomous entities such as spirits, elves, or ancestors. A neurocomputational model, grounded in the active inference framework, explains these experiences by proposing that psychedelics reduce the predictability of sensory perceptions, leading the brain to interpret both internal and external perceptions as coming from non-self agents. The model synthesizes earlier theories including the entropic brain model, computational accounts of felt presence, and sensory attenuation theories of self-other discrimination. It aims to account for how the brain supports entity encounters and for the diversity and similarity of these experiences across cultural contexts.
Frontiers in psychiatry
January 1, 2026
Søren Esben Rytter Heilskov, Julie Nordgaard, Unn Kristin Haukvik et al.
Delusions are often used as key evidence of psychosis in insanity assessments because they are verbalized and express faulty reality judgments. However, psychosis can also involve disturbances that are enacted rather than spoken. This paper revisits Klaus Conrad's concept of "senseless actions"—unintelligible behaviors seen in early schizophrenia—and illustrates its forensic relevance through a historical case study from Karl Wilmanns. These actions reflect a global disruption in how a person finds relevance, meaning, and constraint in the world, and may signal the transition from prodromal to manifest psychosis. The authors argue that evaluating such actions requires contextual and biographical information, and that the concept, though imperfect, can help identify reality disturbances overlooked in current forensic practice.
OSF Preprints
January 1, 2026
Kenneth Hammat
Consciousness mediates between empirical facts, conceptual meaning, and normative values. A triadic neurophenomenological framework posits three irreducible domains—object (material), idea (mental), and relation (axiological)—unified through consciousness. Testable hypotheses predict distinct neural and experiential signatures for each domain, using multimodal neuroimaging, representational similarity analysis, and micro-phenomenology. Reflexive self-consciousness may emerge from recursive interaction between mental and axiological domains, analogous to iterative dynamics in complex systems. A cross-domain classification principle—cohesion, attraction, and stability—maps structural characteristics across the three domains. Applied to artificial intelligence, the framework clarifies that current systems simulate object/idea processing but lack axiological participation.
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
January 1, 2026
Santos Oliveira da Silva Samuel
The Relational Consciousness Theory (TCR v3.2) dissolves the Hard Problem of Consciousness by rejecting dualism, computational reductionism, and panpsychism. Consciousness arises from the 'gesture of flesh'—the pre-reflexive urgency and vulnerability of living organisms—through affective-resonant coupling. Two irreducible modes are distinguished: Sensorial Consciousness (qualia), requiring gesture of flesh, informational integration, affective temporality, and recursion; and Narrative Consciousness (inner voice), a post-hoc linguistic output. A formal threshold C = G × I × T × R is introduced, where qualia emerges only above a critical level.
Frontiers in psychology
January 1, 2026
Conor H Murray, Kafui Dzirasa, Dana Sawyer et al.
Consciousness remains one of the most enduring questions across human history, with thinkers debating its definition, mechanisms, and purpose. This review examines historical and contemporary perspectives from philosophy, science, medicine, and practice, integrating neuroscientific models, clinical applications, and contemplative methods. The authors identify common themes and persistent gaps in knowledge, highlighting opportunities for future investigation. They advance a working model of consciousness that considers how it is constructed, measured, and modified, and why it may be central to survival and human flourishing.
Neuroscience of consciousness
January 1, 2026
Sneha K S Sheth, Mike Doswell, Kalina Christoff Hadjiilieva et al.
Over the past 25 years, neuroscience has focused on perceptual consciousness, but the dynamic experience of the stream of thought—first described by William James—has received less attention. The Dynamic Framework of Thought (DFT) provides a taxonomy of thought dynamics. This study used four experiments, including laboratory, online, and fMRI-based settings, to test whether people can introspectively access and distinguish two thought dimensions: freely moving and deliberately directed. In all experiments, participants reported their thought dynamics during a probed resting period with eyes open. Using mixed methods, the findings suggest that individuals have some introspective access to these dynamics.
Psychopathology
January 1, 2026
Valerio Ricci, Massimiliano Aragona, Giuseppe Maina et al.
1 citation
Hallucinations in schizophrenia, substance-induced psychosis (SIP), and substance-related persistent psychosis (PP) differ qualitatively. Schizophrenic hallucinations typically occur in clear consciousness with variable sensory vividness. SIP hallucinations arise in an oneiroid (dreamlike) state with increased vividness and multisensory integration. PP hallucinations occur in a twilight state of consciousness, often simpler but intrusive. These phenomenological differences provide a conceptual framework for more accurate diagnosis and treatment, especially in substance-related psychopathologies.